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-Policy  in  Sub-Saharan  African countries,is linked with the
region's,agric  uqal  performance.  Exchange  rate  policie",  high
taxes  on agriculture,  and  government  control  of  export  marketing
are associated  with the deterioration  in agricultural  export per-
formance  in 1970-87.  And  the policy  r,eformns  of the late 1980s
-where  sustained  and effective  -are  linked with increased
agricultural  productivity.
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Jaeger  examines  the relationship  between  per capita  production  reflect  primarily  a produc-
government  policy and agriculttal performance  tion  problem. Econometric  results  indicate  that
in Sub-Saharan  Africa  between  1970  and 1987.  most of the rise in Africa's food imports  Is
Using  newly compiled  data enabling  a wider  associated  with shifting  demand  toward  imported
range  of empirical  analyses,  the study assesses,  foods,  rather  than a failure of supply, The main
the impact of policy distortions on productivity  factors causing the shift in demand are increas-
over tune and across  countries. It assesses  ing urbanizatiopi,  higher  import  capacity,  and
export  agriculture  and food  production  sFpa-  exchange  rate  distortions  tAat  make imported
rately.  food relatively  cheap. When  the variation  of
these factors  has been taken into account,  the
eThe  analysis  confirns that  the deterioration  remaining  unexplained  trend is only I percent  a
oAfrica's agricultual exports  during the 1970s  year,  caused  in part by,  declining  interational
snd  early 1980s  was associated  with  prices  for wheat  and rice.
agriculture's  high levels of direct taxation  and of  r
indirect  taxation  thrtugh govermnent  controls  Jaeger  establishes  a link between  policy
and overvalued  currencies. Goverment controls  reforms  and the iniprovements  observed  in
in the marketing  and pricing  of export  crops have  agricultural  perfortance in the late 1980s.
contributed  to thc detetioration  in export  perfir-  Countries  with favorable  policy  environments
mance. But the large indirect  distortions  and  have  performed  better in the 1980s,  on average,
disincentives  caused  by exchange  rate  policies  than those with unfavorable  policy  e9viron-
are what have  distinguished  African  policy  ments. This has been true both in agriculture  and
environments  from those  in non-African  devel-  in overall economic  growth. And  in countries
oping countries. Econometrc rerylts  show that  where  policy  reform  progams resulted  in
the responsiveness  of agricultural  exports to  sinificant and sustained  improvements  in
change in incenttives  is moderate  in the short run  'Incentves (for example,  Ghana and Togno),
for countries  exporting  tree crops but more  productivity  has improved  substantially.  But in
elastic  in countries  exporting  annual  crops.  countries  where  reforis  havenot led to im-
proved incentives  or where the imProvements,
The author  also investigates  Africa's chronic  were short-lived  (for example,  Tanzania  and
food crises and questions  the conventional  Zaire),  little response  was observable.
wisdom  tiha rising food  imports  and declining
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FOREWARD
The Lst two decades  have witnessed  decline  in Africa's  agricultural  exports  and a sharp rise
in the region's food imporis. With over 70 percent  of Africa's people  dependent  on agriculture
for their livelihood,  getting  agriculture  moving  in Africa  is one of the most important  and
formidable  challenges  fazing  Africa in the 1990s. There is now wide recognition  that
government  policies  have contributed  to Africa's crisis and that policy  reforms can help foster
restored  growth.
"The Impact  of Policy  on African  Agriculture:  An Empirical  Investigation'  examines  the
link between  government  policy  and agricultural  performance  across countries  and over most of
the past two decades. The analysis  confirms  that governments'  agricultural  pricing and
marketing  arrangements  and their macroeconomic  policies  have slowed  agricultural  growth. In
particular,  overvalued  currencies  have often caused  the largest  distortions. Recent  trends,
however, offer evidence  that policy  reforms  have helped  improve  agricultural  growth where
these reforms have sustained  agricultural  procedures.
The author  also offers evidence  that government  policies  have been substantially  responsible
for Africa's growing  food imports,  by encouraging  urban migration  and by lowering  the prices
for imported  foods  relative  to domestically-grown  foods.
This study contributes  to a better understanding  of the causes  of Africa's agricultural  crisis
and can help forge a consensus  on how to restore  vitality  in African  agriculture. This work was






Africa's loss of world market shares  for its major agricultural  exports  and the decline  in food
production  per capita  are the most telling  signs  of stagnation  and decline  in Africa  since 1970.
Africa's international  market share for its 12 major  agricultural  commodities  tell by half between
1970  and 1983. Over the same  period, per capita  food production  fell about 1 percent  per year.
Since the mid-1980s,  however,  there have been improvements  in both food and export agriculture,  a
reversal which  has coincided  with the implementation  of policy  reform  programs  by a subsiantial
number  of African  countries.
This paper examines  the impact  of policy  on agricultural  performance  in Sub-Saharan  Africa  in
the 1970s  and 1980s. Based on recently  available  data enabling  a wider range  of detailed  empirical
analysis,  the study assesses  the distorting  effects of government  policies  on incentives,  the impact  of
those distortions  on agricultural  performance,  and the changes  over time and across countries  in both
policies and agricultural  performance Export  agriculture  and food producdon  are assessed
separately.
Africa's  agricultural  export  performance  deteriorated  substandally  from 1970-84. The pattern of
decline  - and partial  recovery in the late-19SOs  - follows  closely  the high levels of distortion  in the
agricultural  sector. These  distortions  were the result of both direct government  controls  on producer
prices for Africa's principal  export  crops and the indirect  effects  of exchange  rate policies. As a
result of these policies,  real producer  prices feil by one-fourth  between  the early 1970s  and early
1980s. The share of these crops' value retained  bv farmers (as measured  by the real protection
coefficient)  dropped  from about  90 percent to about 50 percent, on average, from 1971  to 1983.
Government  controls  and involvement  in the marketing  and pricing  of export crops has been
responsible  for a considerable  share of the deterioration  of producer  incentives,  although  the
magnitude  of these distortions  has not been larger, on average, than in other non-African  developing
countries. However,  large indirect  distortions  and disincentives  have been caused  in Africa  by the
prevalence  of highly  overvalued  currencies,  especially  from the mid-1970¢  to mid-1980s. The large
size and prevalence  of these  indirect  distortions  contrast  with conditions  iL  non-African
developing  countries. Pegged exchange  rate regimes,  coupled  with poor fl6.  management  and high
domestic  inflation,  resulted  in highly  overvalued  currencies. Those countries  which  maintained
grosdly  overvalued  currencies  over extended  periods experienced  severe deterioration  of export
agriculture. CFA-zone  countries  have been more successful  in avoiding  large exchange  rate
distortions  over the period, and thus have been less affected  by the deleterious  effects on agricultural
growth. In the late 1980s,  however,  overvaluadon  of the CFA franc has become  more of a problem.
There has been considerable  debate in the literature  on the responsiveness  of agriculture  to price
incentives  in Africa. The issue  is addressed  here in an econometric  framework  combining  cross-
section  and time-series  data.  In the short-run,  tree crops exports  ate shown to be ordy moderately
responsive  to changes  in price incentives. Elasticities  are on the order of 0.1.  However,  for
countries  exporting  annual  crops the short-run  response  is more  elastic, above  0.9.  Exports  are also
shown to be responsive  to changes  in the real exchange  rate, reflecting  the effects  on price incentives
and on efficiency  caused  by changes  in exchange  and trade restrictions  that generally  accompany
overvalued  currencies. Elasticities  of export  supply  with respect  to the real exchange  rate varied
from 0.1 to 0.3 for tree crop exporters,  and 0.6 for annual  crop exporters. These  estimates  may
not, however,  reflect long-run  responses,  which are influenced  by expected  prices.- vi  -
The possibility  that export agriculture  may crowd  out food production  is examined. Growth  in
export  agriculture  does not appear to come at the expense  of food production. Food producdon  is
positively  correlated  with export  crop prices  and real exchange  rates suggesting  complementarity.
However,  lack of data means  that the impact  of policy on food production  in Africa  cannot  be
analyzed  in the same  way as export  agriculture. Food producdon  data are often  questionable.
Market  price data for food crops are unavailable  for most African  countries. Because  many  African
governments  fix official  prices for food, only those prices are generally  reported  and often  do not
correspond  to actual  market prices. However,  the impact  of policy  on Africa's food problems  can
be examined  indirectly.
Average  food supply  per capita  has not declined  in Africa  since the 1960s. Food supply  per
capita - according  to FAO data - has risen slightly,  on average, s'  esting  that only the
composition  of consumption  has shifted  from domesically-grown  foods to imported  foods  (which  are
often preferred,  especially  among  urban and wealthier  consumers). However,  Africa's chronic  food
crisis is commnonly  assumed  to be both widespread  and worsening,  as evidenced  by declining  food
production  per capita  and rising food imports. It is generally  assumed  that weak domestic
production  creates a need for more imports. The causal  direction  between  imports  and domestic
production  may  be the reverse: that is, a shift in demand  toward  imported  foods may  have resulted
in increased  consumption  of imports,  and therefore  reduced  demand  for domestic  foods. This weak
demand  then led to weak domestic  output. Demand  for imported  foods  may rise due to urbanization,
import capacity,  and the relative  price of imported  to domestic  foods  (which  will be affected  by real
exchange  rates). Indeed, the doubling  of Africa's  food imports  in the late-1970s  was largely the
result  of events  in Nigeria, which  accourned  fur 70 percent of the increase. This occurred  during
Nigeria's  oil boom when  there were large shifts  in import  capacity  (a quadrupling),  the real
exchange  rate, and urban migration.
To t_st the hypothesis  that both rising food imports  and declining  domestic  production  is demand
driven rather than the result  of a production  constraint,  an econometric  model is estimated. The
results confirm  that much  of the rise in Africa's  food imports  can be attributed  to urbanization,
import capacity,  and exchange  rate distortions. When  these factors  have been taken into account, the
remaining  trend is only 1 percent  per year, and this can probably  be explained  by the declining
international  prices for wheat  and rice over the period.
Rural-urban  migration,  which appears  to be a cause  of rising food imports,  is a result  of
government  policies, imciuding  exchange  rate policies  that have altered  the internal  terms of trade in
favor of urban areas. Evidence  of the extent to which  urban migration  is influenced  by policy  - and
the potential  for policy  reform to alter existing  migratory  patterns  - is demonstrated  with recent data
from Ghana. Survey  data confirm  what  has been observed  anecdotally  in several  African  countries:
significant  reverse  migration  is occurring  from non-agricultural  to agricultural  occupations  since the
introduction  of Ghana's reform  program.
The improvements  in aggregate  patterns  of production  and trade in Africa  since the mid-1980s
coincide  with the implementation  of structural  adjustment  programs  in a large number  of African
countries. To assess the evidence  of a causal  relationship,  economic  perfob.ce  in countries  where
policy  distortions  have been relatively  small, is compared  to that in countries  where policy
distortions  have resulted  in an unfavorable  policy  environment. In aggregate,  countries  with
favorable  policy  environments  have performed  better in the late-1980s  than  the countries  with
unfavorable  policy  environments  in virtually  all measures  of economic  performance,  including
agricultural  production,  agricultural  exports, and overall  economic  growth. The experience  in- vii  -
individual  countries  has been quite disparate,  but in countries  where policy  reforms have resulted  in
significant  and sustained  improvements  in incentives  (e.g., Ghana, Togo) productivity  has improved
substantially. In countries  where these  reforms  did not improve  price incentives,  or where the
improvements  were shortlived  (e.g., Tanzania,  Zaire), no significant  response  was observed.
Overall,  the evidence  from this study suggests  that poor policies  have had a major role in the
decr-ne  of African  agriculture. Similarly,  there is evidence  that policy  reforms in the 1980s  have
cor.vibuted  to some modest  improvement.
There has been considerable  debate  about  the scope for policy  response  in Africa, at times
framed in terms  of whether  price or nonprice  factors  constrain  growth  most.  The debate may  be
misleading,  however. First, the distinedon  between  price and nonprice  factors  is sometimes  blurred;
nonprice  constraints  on agriculture  may be seen as being  price related (e.g., the lack of roads implies
high transport  costs; the absence  of extension  services  raises information  costs of new technology).
Second,  the relative  importance  of price and nonprice  factors  will vary from country  to country;
therefore  the debate of their relative  importance  must take account  of specific  country  contexts. And
third, the classificadon  of constraints  into price-  and nonprice-related  is to a large extent analogous
to the dichotomy  between  short-run  and long-run  response  to prices. For example,  bad roads, lack
of irrigaion, poor institutional  infrastructure,  and other "nonprice"  constraints  may be the result of
neglected  investments  caused  by policy distortions  which  have made socially  profitable  investments
privately  unprofitable. Investments  that would  remove  nonprice  constraints  may  become  attractive
when policy  distortions  altering  relative  prio s are lessened.I.  INTRODUCTION
Objective  of the study
The responsiveness  of Sub-Saharan  African  1/ agriculture  to changes  in farm prices and macro-
policies  has emerged  as a critical issue for understanding  Africa's poor agricultural  performance  as well  as
for prescribing  corrective  actions. Views  on the importance  of pricing  policies  vary widely,  and a debate
has emerged  recently  about the relative  importance  of price and "nonprice' factors  both in explaining
Africa's  poor performance  and as the main impediment  to recovery. Surprisingly  little empirical  work  has
been done, however, on aggregate  agricultural  supply  response  in Africa. This has been due at least  in part
to data limitations  that have prevented  extensive  cross-sectional  and time-series  analys,.
Recently,  however, suitable  data have been compiled  to enable  a wider range of more detailed
empirical  analyses. Based on these  data, the objectives  of this paper are: a) to examine  the trends and
magnitude  of policy  distortions  in Africa  and their effects  on agricultural  incentives;  b) to estimate  the
responsiveness  of African  agriculture  to these  policy  changes;  c) to assess  the relative  importance  of these
policies  in explaining  African's  poor agricultural  performance  both fcr food and export crops since 1970;  and
d) to evaluate  the evidence  of a link between  Africa's policy  reform  programs  and recent evidence  of
recovery  in Africa's agricultural  growth.
Within  the agricultural  sector, exported  crops and food crops have itatures that make it difficult  to
address  them  jointly.  Analysis  of food  policy  and growth  gives rise to a variety of distinctive  characteristics
and problems  due to the nature of government  policies,  the importance  of domestic  demand,  and especially
data limitations  on producer  food prices. Given  these complexities,  export  and food crop agriculture  are
examined  separately  below.
Agriculture  is Africa's most important  sector, accounting  for about  80 percent of employment  and 50
to 90 percent of exports. The sector  has performed  poorly since 1970: food  production  has failed to keep
pace with population  growth  and export  agricuture has experenced  declining  market  shares. This slow
growth and loss of competitiveness  in international  markets  coincided  with increasingly  distorted
macroeconomic  policies  and intensified  government  controls  and restrictions  (World  Bank 1989a).
Furthermore,  in the late 1970s,  exceptionally  high commodity  prices for Africa's major exports  (oil, tropical
beverages,  phosphates)  led to unrealistic  expectations,  overextended  borrowing,  and an unmanageable  debt
burden.  The substantial  imbalances  on external  and domestic  public  accounts  created  during this period
evenually compelled  many African  governments  to adopt  macroeconomic  policy  reform  programs.
Declining  revenues  from agricultural  exports  and rising food imports  led to the inclusion  of agriculural
sector  reforms in many of these  reform programs.
Most  of these  reform  programs  were initiated  during the first half of the 1980s. And  beginning  in
1985,  agricultural  performance  and agricultural  export  market shares  began  to show signs  of recovery, with
agricultural  production  growing  at 4 percent  per year from 1985-88  - faster than  population  growth  for the
first extended  period since 1970  (World  Barl; 1989a). These  patterns  have heightened  interest  - as well as
the debate - on the merits and limits of poliay  reform  as a basis for recovery  in Africa.
1  Throughout  the paper "Africa"  is used to donate  Sub-Saharan  Africa.-2-
Conceptual  Framework
It is generally  agreed  that agricultural  growth is lnked to farm profits - where farm profits are
affected  by a range  of factors  including  government  policy. Output prices,  input costs,  and
exchange  rates are central to most discussions  of the responsiveness  of agriculture  to policy,  but
since farm profits are affected  by wages,  interest rates, market imperfections,  information,  etc.,
these factors  need to be taken into account as well (Binswanger).
Govermnent  polcHy  can affect farm profitability  through a) control over output and Input
prices,  b) taxation  or subsidies  that affect  those prices,  c) controls  on wages  and interest rutes, d)
Institutional  arrangements  (eg., access  to credit, inputs, information),  and e) actions that affect
profitabiity and productivity  in other sectors.
Direct government  poicies, including  price fixing  for products  or inputs, or the taxation  of
their trade, affect the profitability  of farming  directly,  and result i  the shifting  of resources
between  crops, or in moving  resources  out of agriculture  into other sectors.
Macroeconomic  poUcies  affect farm profits in several  indirect  but critical ways. Nominal
exchange  rates set an upper bound on the price paid to farmers  for exported  commodities  (less
transport and processing  costs, and net of subsidies). In the same way,  exchange  rates (together
with import taxes and other restrictions)  set prices  of inputs and agricultural  imports  which
compete  with domestic  production.
Overvaluation  of the exchange  rate can result in severe  welfare  and efficiency  costs, both
directly  from the misallocation  of productive  resources,  and indirectly  as a result of the exchange
and trade controls that usually  accompany  overvaluation.  These indirect effects  from trade and
exchange  controls  can be the biggest  costs associated  with overvaluation  (Edwards  1989a). in
addition,  such controls  generate  unproductive  resource  use from rent seeking  activities.
An appreciation  of the real exchange  rate (or raising  the relative  prices of nontradables  to
tradables)  raises the cost of producing  tradables in terms of nontradables,  and therefore reduces
directly  the profitability  of producing  these goods. Moreover,  the shifting  of the internal terms of
trade against agriculture  will encourage  migration  from rral  to urban areas due to the loss of
competitiveness  of agriculture  and growth in demand  for nontradables,  as well as from protection
of urban-based  manufacturing.  Migration  may occur as a result of other policies  too, such as the
provision  of cheap food and other services  for urban populations.
In addition to pricing  policies  and macroeconomic  policies,  government  expenditure  and
i'vestment In the agricultural  sector can have important  effects  on fAm profits and are critical to
long-term  competitiveness  and agricultural  growth. By and large these pollcy  measures  are aimed
at red-..  -ng costs of production  in order to raise profits and stimulate  growth:  construction  of
transjrt  infrastructure  will lower transport costs thus reducing  input prices and raising  output
prices at the famgate; extension  services  can be seen as reducing  the costs of information  (that are
otherwise  unavailable  at almost  any reasonable  price); rural credt institutions  make credit available
at a lower cost to farmers;  and research  strives  to raise proflts by way of technological  change.
Factors affecting  farm proflts of this type are sometimes  referred to as "non-price  fators!
The macoeconomic  policy  environment  that has led to real exchange  rate appreciation  is
generally  charcterized by intemnal  as well as external  imbalances. High inflation,  negative  real
interest rates, and restricted  access  to credit add to the harmful effects  on investments  in*3-
agricultural  as well  as non-agricultural  sectors.  ro the extent that agriculture  is not a protected
industry,  the adverse,  effec-t on investment  will  be even larger.
Government  intervention  in marketing  of farm products and inputs affects  farm profits when
these institutional  arrangements  resuit in inefficiencies,  delays,  fragmented  markets,  or inflated  costs
that depress producer  prices. And governments  intervene  in other areas that affect farm profits as
well,  such as in land tenure policies  or the allocation  of newly  product've  lands (eg. irrigated).
In addition to policy  measures  aimed at promoting  agricvutural  growth,  governments  intervene
in the interests  of consumers  (price levels  and stabilization),  and to raise revenues  (taxation  of
agricultural  exports is an important  source of revenue  in most African  countries). These two typW
of policies  have distributional  consequences  between  rural and urban peoples,  and between  export
crop and food crop producers.
Most African  governments  exercise  some control in the marketing  and pricing  of export  crops,
fixing  prices in most cases,  although  so.  '  have recently  liberalized  these markets. Major food
commodities,  both domestcally  produced  and imported,  have come under government  control for
reasons of price stabilization,  keeping  prices low for consumers,  and to prohibit excess  profits and
control of markets  by private traders. Cheap food policies,  although common  in Africa,  have been
difficult  to enforce in most countries,  giving  rise to large parallel  markets,  and making  officially
announced  prices  often of little relevance  to producers.
H.  TEE IMPACT  OF POIYCY  ON AGRICULTURAL  EXPORTS
Trends in Prices.  Policy  Distortione,  and Exports
Africa's  loss of world market shares for its major agricultural  exports is the most telling
evidence  of its loss of competitiveness.  Africa's  share of those markets for its 12 major agricultural
exports fell by half between 1970  and 1983. And the volume  of agricultural  export  actually
declined  as well,  falling from 14 million  metric  tons to about 11 million  over the same period. _y
As figure 1 confirms,  the average  pattern across  26 countries  where complete  data are available
suggest  that the loss of competitiveness  in international  markets  has followed  closely  the pattern WL
overvalued  exchange  rates (real effective  exchange  rate index  is inverted  for better visual
presentation),  and lower real producer  prices. For these 26 countries,  only after exchange  rate
distortions  began to decline  and real prices  paid to farmers  began to rise in 1984,  did export
volumes  improve.
The decline  and recent recovery  of agricultural  exports  appears to follow  closely  the pattern of
real effective  exchange  rates over the period, except  for 1987. Real producer  prices have  generally
followed  a similar pattern, although  declining  more slowly  in the mid-1970s  due the boom in
international  coffee  and cocoa  prices. The decline  in export  volumes  in 1987  is primarily  the result
y  FAO weighted 'verage  export  volumes  for total agricultural  commodities.  Much of the analysis
is focused  on exl.  . volumes  rather than agricultural  production. Agricultural  production  data is
of questionable  quality  given  the rough estimation  jrocedures relied on for most ccuntries. Since
for most export crops domestic  consumption  is small relative  to the total exported  (cocoa,  coffee,
tea, rubber, tobacco,  cotton), export  volumes  can be takes as a proxy  for total production  for most
of these crops.4-
Figure 1.  Policy, incentives, and agric-
ultural exports  in Sub-Saharan Africa
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of lower output  amonig  major coffee  growers. Exports  rose in 1988  according  to preliminary  data available
at the time of this writing.
Direct pricing policy  distortions. A variety  of government  acdons can affect producer  prices directly  (fixing
prices, export taxes, marketing  arrangements,  etc).  The net effect of which is often  complex. To assess the
magnitude  of the collective  distorting  effects  of these  policies,  some kind of measure  is needed to capture  the
net effect  of these complex  interventions. The most commonly  used measure  of the distorting  effects  of
policy is the nominal  protection  coefficient  (NPC)  - or ratio of producer  price to border price adjusted  for
marketing  costs  - which compares  what  a farmer receives  to the maximum  he could  receive  short of
subsidies  (an NPC less than  one indicates  a tax on producers,  an NPC greater than one would  reflect  a
subsidy). NPCs have been widely  used to assess the effect of policy on agricultural  incentives,  as a
relatively  simple  means  of assessing  the divergence  of producer  prices from what they would  be in the
absence  of government  policies.  I/
Figure 2 indicates  that NPCs for Africa's major exports  have  fallen and risen twice since 1970,  and
are now at a level of about 1.0, on average,  but having fallen  below 0.5 in 1976. The range of NPCs varies
widely  among  countries  and over time (see Annex  D tables 1 and 2), from as low as 0.16 for Ghanaian
cocoa in 1976  to as high as 2.6 for Senegalese  groundnuts  in 1987. In most countries  the NPC varies
erratically  from year to year because  producer  prices are usualy set at the beginning  of the growing  season,
long before the international  price that wiUl  be received  for their production  in the folowing year is
known.  4/  Only in the few countries  where the producer  price is based on what is eventually  received  for
their product (using  a rebate system)  as in Kenyan  and Ethiopian  coffee,  and Malawian  tobacco,  are the
NPCs more stable  across  years.
The degree of taxation  implicit  in these  NPCs is in many  cases substantial. However,  it does not
appear to be significantly  higher  during this period than in other  developing  regions when  compared  to those
estimates  (Binswanger  and Scandizzo;  Krueger, Schiff, Valdes).
Macconomic  policy distor  Thons.  I  e NPC as a measure  of policy  distortion  suffers,  however, from at
least two important  drawbacks. First, the NPC does not take account  of exchange  rate misalignment  or
the implicit  taxation  that it can represent,  and thus will understate  the degree  of agricultural
taxation  when  exchange  rates are overvalued. And  second, changes  in the NPC over time arise
from three sources,  but the reladve importance  of any one factor relative  to the net
I/  A broad range of agricultural  and macroeconomic  data for 1970  to 1988  were used to examine  policies,
incentives,  and performance  for up to 40 African  countries  (see Annex  A for details). The time period being
considered  and the number  of countries  involved  lends itself to an analysis  of cross-sectional  and time-series
data.  NPCs for each country's  major  export  and food crops have  been computed  as the ratio of producer
price to border price net of all processing  and marketing  costs. Both numerator  and denominator  are
adjusted  to reflect the comparison  of producer  to border prices  at the "last  joint marketing  point' (Westlake);
the border in the case of exports,  and the major consumption  center for import  substituting  food crops.  See
Scandizzo  and Bruce (1980)  for computational  details.
41/  The wide swings in NPCs  from year to year explains,  in part, conflicting  findings  in the literature  as to
the degree  - and direction  - of policy  distorting  effects in a particular  country. Unless  such  studies  are
comparing  producer  prices and international  prices for the same  year, significant  differences  are likely to
occur in the conclusions. Given these  wide variations  over time, multi-year  analyses  are advisable.-6-
Figure 2. Nominal and real protection
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effects is ambiguous. Taking account  of these  effects  is important,  especiaUy  because  exchange  rates
across Africa  became  highly  overvalued  during the 1970s,  and have become  less overvalued  in the
1980s.
Both limitations  of the NPC are addressed  here, first by computing  "real protection  coefficients"
(RPC) to take into account  changes  in the degree of currency  overvaluation  using the real exchange
rate, and second  by "decomposing"  the annual  changes  in these  RPC's in order to reveal the source
of the changes  because  of changes  in producer  price, international  price, or exchange  rate.
The RPC is computed  by adjusting  the NPC for changes  in the real exchange  rate, using 1970  as
a base year. 5/  The RPC will diverge  from the NPC to the extent that the implicit  taxation  from
exchange  rate policies  has changed.  {/  Given the extent of exchange  rate misalignment  that has
occurred  among  African  countries,  the RPC offers a better means  for assessing  how changes  in
policy  have affected  agriculture  (See Annex  Table 3).  Figure 2 depict both the NPC and RPC from
1970  to 1987. The two are equal  by definition  in 1970,  but diverge  significantly  between 1978  and
1984  indicating  an increase  in the degree  of exchange  rate misalignment.  The difference  is quite
large, accounting  on average  for 20 percent of the producer's  fair value  of his production,  and
maldng  clear that the rise in the NPC in 1980-81  was really a "false  improvement"  whereby  a higher
share of the border price (converted  at the official  exchange  rate) was being received  by producers,
but at the same  time the indirect  effects  of increasily  overvalued  domestic  currencies  reduced
agriutural  competitiveness  in a less direct but potentially  more distorting  way.
The differences  between  the NPC and the RPC is quite  large in those countries  where exchange
rate misalignment  had become  severe: an NPC of 2.8 compares  to an RPC of 0.51 for Ghanaian
cocoa m 1981;  in Uganda  the NMC  for coffee  is 1.51, while  the RPC is 0.17 in 1980. For CFA
coumtries  which historically  have kept  exchange  rates in better alignment,  the differences  are small
(less than 0.1), with some divergence  during 197741 and 198546 (figure  3).  The divergence  in
1985-86  appears  to have diminished  in 1987,  the result  of a decline  in the average REER  in 1988  for
CFA countries  due to the strengthening  of the french  franc  vis-a-vis  to U.S. dollar.
5/  Both the NPC and RPC are computed  for split  crop years (i.e. 1970/71),  so that the producer
prices for 1970  crop year are comphred  to internatonl  prices  for the corresponding  marketing
year, which  is 1971. For that reasonl  1971  rather than 1970  is used as a base for the real
effective  exchange  rate in computing  the RPC for 1970.
{/  The RPC will take account  of changes  in the degree  of exchange  rate misalignment,  but not
in the absolute  level. Only if there had been no misalignment  in the base year, 1971,  would the
RPC accurately  show  the level of both direct and implicit  tamtion of agriculture. The average
level of exchange  rate distron  appears  to have been relaively small  in 1971  based on the ratio
of official  to parallel  market exchange  rates, which averaged  1.2 for countries  with available
data.  Choosing  a base year prior to the first oil price shock  and subsquent volatility  has
obvious  advantages. Still, exchange  rates were serously overvalued  at that tme in several
countries,  reflected  in high rados of parallel  to official  exchange  rates: Ethiopia  (1.17), Ghana
(1.48), Kenya (1.35), Malawi  (1.37), Sudan  (1.77), Tanzania  (1.62), Uganda  (1.48), Zaire
(1.45), and Zambia  (1.49). In Nigeria the parallel  market  rate in 1971  was below the official
rate.Figure 3. NPCs and RPCs in CFA countries
for major export  crops
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NPC  -RPCThe actual levels of direct and implicit taxation (not just  relative to a base year) of agricultural
producers is difficult to  assess short of elaborate and computationally difficult methods such as
those recently developed by Krueger, Schiff, and Valdez, but as an approximation the RPC can be
adjusted proportionally to  the base year ratio of parallel market exchange rate to official exchange
rate, and termed "adjusted RPC".  Using this rough estimation procedure, the average adjusted
RPC is  compared for CFA-zone countries (where no significant parallel market distortion existed in
1971) and non-CFA countries (where the average ratio of parallel market to official exchange rate
was 1.46 in  1971).  The result (figure 4) suggests that: a) the degree of direct and implicit taxation
of agriculture has been substantially higher in non-CFA countries throughout most of the past two
decades, averaging 0.5 from 1970-1985,  b) the adjusted RPC has fluctuated more in CFA countries,
with averages ranging from 0.4 to  1.25, and c) for both sets of countries the level of direct and
implicit taxation have moved in the direction of increased incentives to producers since 1984. 2/
The underlying cav-ses  of the large fluctuations in the RPC can be revealed by "decomposing"
the annual change into its component effects. §/  The three principal effects causing changes in the
RPC  are the nominal producer price, the real exchange rate, and the international price. 2/  In
figure 5 each set of three bars will sum to  the annual change in the overall RPC.  Each bar
represents the influence of each of the three major factors on  the overall change in the RPC from
the  previous year; the sum of the three  bars will reflect the change in the RPC from the previous
year.  For example, in 1972, the large negative effect of international price changes (rising
international commodity prices) outweighs the smaller positive change due to nominal producer
price changes and  exchange rate changes, so that the net effect is a  decline in the NPC between
1971 and  1972.  By contrast, in 1986 the rise in nominal producer prices outweighed the small
downward influence of changes in the exchange rate, resulting in a net effect raising the average
RPC in 1986 over 1985.
Figure 5 shows that  the decline in RPCs in the early 1970s was due  to rising international
prices unaccompanied by higher farm prices (which causes the RPC to fall), and smaller real
exchange rate depreciations in 1973 and  1975.  Producer prices were raised as indicated in the
figure, by substantial amounts in 1973, 1975, and  1976,  although only a portion  of the international
price rise was passed on  to producers.
Beginning in  1980, large nominal devaluations in exchange rates drove the RPC down.  The
average RPC rose ag,ain in 1981 due to a drop in international prices (which were not fully passed
on  to producers), but in  1982 and  1983, the large devaluations lowered the average RPC
substantially.  Not until 1984, with the increased scope for raising nominal producer prices
following devaluation, were the RPCs raised as a result of large increases in producer prices in
1984-87.  In 1987 increased producer prices were offset by exchange rate devaluation (occurring in
1988), resulting in a small decline in the RPC.
2/ These results are reiatively close to those estimated in Krueger, Valdez, Schiff for Cote d'Ivoire
and Zambia.  But for  Ghana, they estimate a lower level of total taxation of cocoa during the
1975-79 period than  estimated here.
/  See Jaeger and Humphreys for the derivation.
2/  If only producer prices rise, the RPC will rise; if only international prices rise, the RPC will
fall; if only the real exchange rate rises, the RPC will fall.-10
Figure 4. Adjusted RPOs  for Africa's
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Figure 5. Decomposition of changes in
RPCs for  African export crops
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As of 1986,  the average  RPC was greater than 1.0. This reflects  several  factors. First, several
CFA countries  recently  began subsidizing  producers  (rather than taking the politically  unpopular
decision  to lower producer  prices).  IQ/  In addition, several  other countries  now have REERs
which are "undervalued"  relative  to 1971, making  their RPCs greater than 1.0.  Taking account,
however, of the exchange  rate distortions  at that time - accomplished  to a large extent by the
"adjusted"  RPC -- leaves the net effect as a taxation  on agriculture  (figure  4).
Real producer  price trends. The net effect of both direct and indirect  policy changes,  as well as
changes  in international  prices, are felt most directly  by producer  in terms the real prices received.
Real producer  prices for Africa's major export  commodities  have witnessed  wide fluctuations  since
1970  (figure 1).  Throughout  much  of the 1970s  these  prices rose, on average, reflecting  the rise in
international  commodity  prices in the mid-  to late-1970s,  primarily  for tropical  beverages. The rise
in producer  prices for these commodities,  however, was  far less than the increase  on internadonal
markets  where real prices for primarily  commodities  more than  doubled,  whereas  real producer
prices rose, on average, less than 15 percent.
Between  1977  and 1982, the real prices received  by farmers  for these exports  fell 25 percent
resuldng in part from a return to lower prices following  the "boom' in tropical  beverage  prices in
the mid 1970s,  but also due to high domestic  inflation  and the reluctance  of governments  in Africa to
respond  by adjusting  their exchange  rates.  Only  after exchange  rates were devalued,  and real
producer  prices raised, did export  performance  begin  to improve.
Exprt  supDDl  resnonse
The response  of agricultural  production  to changes  in policies  and incentives  is a central  issue
with important  implications  for governments  and donors. Views  range widely  on the responsiveness
of agricultural  production  to price and this has given rise, to much  debate (Chhibber,  Binswanger,
Cleaver 1988).
One source of these  differing  views is the distinction  between  the supply  response  of individual
crops - when factors  of production  can be quickly  shifted  from one crop to another - and aggregate
supply  response  which, in the long-run  requires  either additional  resources  to move  from other
sectors, higher investmenu,  or technological  change  to bring about  higher productivity. The fact
that farmers  respond  strongly  to changes  in the relative  prices  of individual  crops is well documented
in empirical  studies. This, however, tells us little about  the aggregate  response  to changes  in
agriculual  prices  overall.
For African  countries,  relatively  few supply  response  studies  have tried to assess the relative
importance  of price, non-price  factors, and exogenous  shocks  in explaining  agricultural  growdt
(Wheeler  is a notable  exception). And none has exploited  the potential  strength  of using pooled
cross-sectional  time-series  analysis  to explain these  reladonships.
IQ/ This situation  arose as the CFA franc, which is ded to the French franc, has appreciated
making  the US$ denominated  international  commodity  prices  appear much  lower in local
currency  terms.- 13  -
In addition,  while much  attention  has been  placed on the direct price incentives  (generally
producer  prices), little work has included  the indirect  effects  of macroeconomic  policy distortions  on
agricultural  growth, especially  exports  (balassa, 1988,  has used the real exchange  rate as a proxy for
iLt.entives).  Real exchange  rates affect the competitiveness  of agricultural  exports by altering  the
relative  prices of inputs and products. But inclusion  of the real exchange  rate - in addition  to real
prices - serves as a proxy for the costs -id efficiency  losses  associated  with trade and exchange
restrictions  that generally  occur wheh exchange  rates are highly  overvalued.
The analysis  presented  here utilizes  time-series  data for the 1970-87  period  and for 21 countries
to estimate  the response  of agriculture  to changes  in real producer  prices, macioeconomic  policies
(specificaUy  the real exchange  rate), the effect of weather,  and major shocks  in the form of
"disasters"  (including  war, civil strife, famine, floods,  or other disruptions).  L1/
The model  is as follows:
AGRICULTURAL  EXPORTS  =  b 0 + b, REAL PRODUCER  PRICE +b2 REAL
EFFECTIVE  EXCHANGE  RATE + b 3 WEATHER  +
b4 DISASTERS  + e
The analysis  focuses  on exports  of agricultural  commodities  (cocoa, coffee,  tea, etc.).  For most
of these commodities,  nearly  all production  is exported  so that exports  are a reasonable
approximation  of production  except  in cases where domestic  consumption  is large relative  to exports
(as in the case of palm oil), or where smuggling  results in a significant  divergence  of recorded
exports from actual  production.  12/ The food crop sector  is, for the moment,  left out of the
analysis. To estimate  similar  supply  equations  for food crops would  be problematic  due to the lack
of adequate  producer  price data.  This results in part from the prevalence  of officially  announced
prices for food crops which in many countries  have little relation  to what farmers  actually  receive.
These official  prices are often  the only available  price series. The interaction  between  food
production  and policy  variables  is addressed  below.
Weather  has an important  impact  on agricultural  production  in Africa,  but quantifying  that effect
is problematic. Rainfall  data is spotty  and difficult  to interpret  correctly  short of complex  simulation
models  of soil moisture,  daily rainfall, and evapotranspiration  data, and different  rainfall  patterns
will effect individual  crops differently. An approximation  for the general  effect of weather  on
agriculture  is derived  here by estimating  a regression  trend line for cereal  yields, and taking  the
iL/  Specification  of variables  and data sources  can be found  in Annex  A.
12/ Several  countries  have been excluded  from the anm 1ysis  because  of obvious  "border  effects"
and smuggling. These  include  Benin  and Zambia  where  dramatic  swings  in agricultural  exports
appear to have resulted  from policy  changes  and border closings  in neighboring  countries. Also,
Rwanda  and Burundi  are excluded  due to apparent  smuggling  - exports exceeded  production  by
substantial  amounts  in several  years.  Ghana  is often  thought  to have substantial  smuggling  but it
is unclear  that this accounts  for a substantial  share of total production.- '4  -
Figure 6. The impact  of weather  on
African  agriculture
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residuals  of that esimated trend to be a proxy for the effect of weather  on agriculture  in each
year. Il/  The results are consistent  with expectadons  overall  (figure  6) and for individual
countries  and years where drought  (Ghana  and Senegal,  1983)  or abundant  harvests  (Burkina  1985,
1986)  are known  to have occurreJ.
Major shocks  such as war, civil strife, and natural  disasters  such as floods  or cyclones  have also
had devastating  effects on specific  African  countries. The potendal  impact  of these  phenomenon  are
taken into account  in the model  by including  the percentage  of the populatdon  affected  by 'disasters"
as recorded  in "Major  Disasters  Worldwide"  (USAID).
The real effective  exchange  rate (REER)  is included  in the model  (an increase  in the REER
indicates  appreciation). As a measure  of the eompetitiveness  of agriculture  it incorporates  some of
the incentives  accounted  for by the real producer  price. However,  REERs  also provide  a more
general  measure  of distortions  in product  and faitor markets,  as well as serving as a proxy for the
indirect  effects  of the exchange  and trade controls  that usually  accompany  overvaluation.
The results of the pooled cross-section  time-series  model  JAI  are presented  in table 1 (and
Annex  table 14). They include  a number  of variations  of lagged  and moving  averages  in the
independent  variables,  and two subgroups  of countries; a) those exporting  primarily  tree crops, and
b)  those exporting  primarily  annual  crops. (Crop specific  and country  models  are presented  below.)
The weather  variable  is strongly  significant  in all of the equadons. The coefficient  ranges from
0. 15  to 0.46 and is highest  for the annual  crop producers. The coefficients  can be interpreted  as a
10 percent  drop from trend for cereal  yields  associated  with a 1.5 to 4.6 percent  decline  in exports.
The "disasters"  variable  has the expected  sign and is significant  in most cases.
The estimated  price elasticities  of export supply  for all countries  range  from 0.1 to 0.3, and the
elasticities  with respect  to REE  range  from -0.1 to -.25.  For countries  exporting  primarily  tree
crops (where  longer  lagged  responses  are expected)  the REER  is the most consistent  explanatory
variable  with elasticities  ranging  from -0.14 to -0.25; the price elasticities  for tree crop exporters  are
only significant  when the REER  is excluded  (with an elasticity  of 0. 115)  or in one case significant
with the wrong sign (an elasticity  of -0.06).
Higher price elasticities  can be expected  from countries  exporting  annual  crops such as tobacco
and cotton,  as farmers  are more able to respond  quickly  to changes  in relative  price incentives  by
,3/  Cereals  are the most susceptible  crop to moisture  stress,  and for most countries  variation  in
average  yields  of cereals will result  primarily  from variations  in weather. While exported  crops
may respond  differently  to specific  weather  patterns,  the deviations  from trend can be expected
to be of the same sign. Year to year variations  in cereal  yields could  arise due to fluctuations  in
ferdlizer  avallability  or other policy  related  factors,  but with few excepdons  ferdlizer  is not
widely  used on cereals and other factors  are not likely to dominate  the effects  of rainfall.
J1/  The pooling  of cross-section  tme-series data can be accomplished  several  ways depending
on the characteristics  of the data.  Since  these  data are time-wise  autoregressive  and cross-
secdonally  correlated,  a  hree-stage  procedure  is required  to produce  consistent,  unbiased
estimates  foliowing  Kmenta  (pp. 512-514),  and using the SAS Park estimation  procedure  from
SAS SUGI  Supplemental  software.- 16  -
altering  their cropping  pattern. The estimated  elasticities  for these  countries  are indeed  much  higher,
ranging  from 0.56 to 0.94, suggesting  highly  responsive  adjustments  to changes  in real prices. For
this subgroup,  however,  the real exchange  rate variable  is only weakly  significant  in one case, and
has the wrong sign. II/
Overall, these results  indicate  that agriculture  is only moderately  responsive  to changes  in
pricing  and exchange  rate policies  in the short-term. Producers  of annual  crops such as cotton  or
tobacco  respond  quickly  and with an elasticity  near 1.0.  The estimated  elasticities  for tree crop
exporters  are low, reflecting  the limitations  on quick  adjustments  for these crops. Even a three to
five year lagged  price variable  will be inadequate  for estimating  long-run  supply  responses  in these
cases, both because  adjustments  can take longer  than that, and because  farmers  respond  to changes  in
expected  prices, not short-term  booms or busts  that will not be expected  to persist. Shorter-run
responses  can come only from rehabilitating  existing  plantations.
These results indicate  that for tree crops the indirect  relationship  with respect  to the exchange
rate.  is stronger than the relationship  with producer  prices. This might reflect  indirect  effects  caused
by the constraints  and distorting  trade and exchange  controls  that commonly  occur when exchange
rates are overvalued. Or the estimates  may be biased  upward  as a result  of  the omission  of
unrecorded  production  and smuggled  exports  that tend to occur when  exchange  rates are seriously
overvalued.
Crop specific  models  of agricultural  exports  were esimated for several  major export
commodities  (table 2).  The results are similar  to those in table 1.  The short-run  responsiveness  to
price is about 0.23 for coffee, about  the same  for cocoa  but not significant. For cotton, an annual
crop, the responsiveness  of exports to price is much  higher with an elasticity  of 0.67 both for the
producer  price and the real exchange  rate.  For tea the results were not significant,  apparently  due to
the small sample.
J1/ The significance  of the overall equations  has been tested  using a covariance  model  and is
highly significant  at the 99% level.  The three-stage  pooled  esdmation  procedure  does not permit
computation  of F-values.Table 1.  Rearession EAuation for Agricultural Supplv in Sub-Saharan AfricaL
All countries  Tree Crop Exporters  Annual Crop Eyporters
Model  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Producer Price
Moving average (t and t-1)  0.202  0.240  0.017  0.115  0.940  0.920
(12.97)  (204.2)  (1.13)  (5.04)  (6.26)  (6.08)
Real effective exchange rate
Moving average (t and  t-1)  -0.104  -0.253  0330
(4.15)  (-13.86)  (2.09)
Disasters variable  -0.0006  -0.0010  -0.0003  -0.0016  0.0013  0.0009
(-2.15)  (49.7)  (-0.43)  (-1.69)  (0.92)  (0.67)
Weather variable  0.373  0382  0.153  0.219  0.440  0.435
(21.64)  (299)  (5.18)  (5.54)  (6.29)  (5.7)
Intercept  4.12  3.44  5.62  4.01  -1.29  033
(26.87)  (625)  (41.5)  (36.8)  (-1.46)  (0.47)
Degrees of freedom  331  332  219  220  91  92
Note.  Exports, producer prices, exchange  rate, and  the weather variable have been expressed in logarithms.  Their coefricianct  may be
interpreted as elasticities.
Figure in parentheses are t-values.- 18 -
Table 2.  RegresIo  Eaudtons for Agdricutural-SuDply  In Sub-Sabaran  A-frca: CrM models
Depndant v  ble:  total agrcultural exports
Cocoa  Coffee  Cotton  Tea
Producer  price a/  0.22*  0.23**  0.67**  -0.04
(1.75)  (8.07)  (4.02)  (-0.50)
Real effecdve exchange  rate a/  4.35**  0.055*  -0.68**  0.126
(-3.91)  (1.94)  (-5.04)  (0.65)
Disasters  variable  -0.0067  -0.0037** 0.0026  -0.0192**
(-1.49)  (-2.86)  (1.64)  (-3.14)
Weather  variable  -0.20  -0. 163**  0.226*  0.033
(-1.65)  (-2.82)  (2.4)  (0.21)
Intercept  5.16**  3.30**  4.43**  4.24**
(5.8)  (15.2)  (3.9)  (4.02)
Degrees  of freedom  107  219  171  59
Countries  7  14  11  4
Notes:  Exports, producer  price, exchange  rate, and the rainfall  variable  have been expressed  in
logarithms. Their coefficiants  may  be interpreted  as elasticities.
Years refer to split crop years (e.g. 1980/8  1).  Since  marketing  occurs in the second  of the two
calandar  years, export  data for the 1981  calandar  year correspond  to prices, rainfal, etc. for 1980.
The pooled cross-ection time series procedure  was used.
Figures in parentheses  are t-values. Significance  levels are * (955) and ** (99%).
a/  Two year moving  average (t and t-1)Table 3.  Regression Eguations for Agricultural SuRpIv  in Sub-Saharan Africa:  Country models.
Dependant variable:  total agricultural exports
Ethiopia  Ghana  Kenya  Malawi  Nigeria  Senegal  Tanzania  Togo  Zimbabwe
Producer Price a/  -0.84*  1.17*  -0.48  -0.07  0.22  1.52  0.42  2.1**  0.86*
(-2.3)  (3.8)  (-2.0)  (-0.14)  (0.56)  (1.83)  (0.58)  (3.3)  (2.48)
Real effective exchange  rate a/  -1.64*  0.32  0.35  2.13*  -1.03**  1.65  -1.07*  0.24  0.29
(-2.55)  (1.6)  (0.27)  (2.99)  (-4.4)  (0.22)  (-2.6)  (0.29)  (1.75)
Disasters variable  -0.0016  -0.019*  -0.046  -0.005  4.18  0.0008  -0.007  0.068*  -9.03
(-0.15)  (-2.68)  (-0.75)  (-0.12)  (1.52)  (0.126)  (-0.24)  (2.51)  (-0.66)
Weather variable  -0.029  -0.40  0.96*  -0.023  -0.40  1.36  -0.65  -0.146  0.56**
(-0.069)  (1.84J  (2.23)  (-0.049)  (-0.66)  (2.02)  (-0.66)  (-0.38)  (4.08)
Intercept  15.9  -2.15  5.2  -4.90  &16**  -10.07  7.54  -6.17  -0.73
(3 79)  (-2.17)  (0.80)  (-3.78)  (3.1)  (-1.45)  (1.62)  (-1.01)  (-.41)
Degree of freedom  12  12  12  12  12  12  12  12  12
R square  0.66  0.85  0.72  0.85  0.81  0.64  0.75  0.78  0.62
Note:  Exports, producer price, exchange rate, and the rainfall variable have been expressed in logarithms.  Their coefficiants may
be interpreted as elasticities.
Years refer to split crop years (eg.  1980181). Since marketing occurs in the second of the two calendar years, export data
for the 1981 calendar year correspond to prices, rainfall, etc  for 1980.
*  indicates statistically significant at the 95% leveL
**  indicates statistically significant at the 99%O  leveL
a/  Two-year moving average.- 20 -
Country-specific models were also estimated (table 3).  There are striking differences between
these models and those estimated pooling cross-section and time-series data.  The estimated
elasticities differ widely between countries.  For  a number of countries the elasticity with respect to
price, or with respect to  the exchange rate, is quite  high (Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, Togo), often
around 1.0, and in one  case exceeding 2.0.  /  These wide differences in estimated elasticities may
reflect the small number of observations or other  data problems, or the diversity among African
countries that gives rise to real differences in the responsiveness of farmers to price incentives (see
Section IV below).
Estimates of aggregate supply response in the literature range from 0.1 to 0.5 (Binswanger,
Bond, Chhibber).  But procedures used to estimate long-run elasticities such as the Nerlove
techniques (which uses lagged dependent variables to derive intertemporal adjustment coefficients)
provide estimates that are generally believed to be too low and not good estimates of the response
of crops to a permanent change in the price regime of agriculture (Binswanger). In addition, there
are problems with the interpretation of distributed lag models, and simultaneity problems that can
arise in the data.
In summary, current statistical methods appear inadequate to estimate reliably long-run supply
response.  Since the year-to-year price fluctuations in the data normally reflect short-lived
commodity booms rather  than permanent changes from a low price to a high price regimen, any
estimate based on  these data will reflect short-run adjustments rather than long-run responses to
permanent changes in price levels (Binswanger).  Farmers will respond to expcted  prices, which
are generally not observable.  Given the preponderance of tree crop exports in Africa, it is not
surprising that  these short-run elasticities are low.  The long-run aggregate supply response will
include the effect of reallocation of productive resources, labor and capital, among sectors in the
economy overall.  It may also include changes in government expenditures and public capital
investments for infrastructure, research, human capital and institutional support which may be more
forthcoming in the context of higher incentives.
m.  THE IMPACT OF POLICY ON THE FOOD CROP SECTOR
Analysis of the food crop sector in African countries is more problematic than  export crops
due to poor quality and limited availability of the production and price data -- in addition to other
differences.  Many African countries set official food prices, and thus only the officially announced
price figures are available.  For a majority African countries, however, official prices are  not
effectively  enforced, and most producers receive a market determined price for their food sales.
16/  In three cases the estimated price elasticity is negative -- Ethiopia, Kenya, and Malawi --
although only significant for Ethiopia.  These three countries differ from the others in that
producer prices are determined ex post at international auctions.  Farmers will not respond to
current or lagged prices unless they reflect changes in expected price.  Because prices received by
farmers in these countries fluctuate widely from year to year, very high prices paid in one year may
do little to change their price expectations unless there is some perceived change in the long-term
price level for their products in international markes.  Hence, the lack of a signiflcant relationship
is not surprising, although in the case of Ethiopia the negative sign is puzzling, and may reflect
complications related to coffee quotas, or the influence of Ethiopian exports on price.- 21 -
Cross-Drice  effects  between  export  prices and food
The elasticities  esdmated  above for export  crops will overstate  the responsiveness  of aggregate
agriculture  if higher  exports are offset by a faU  in food production  (in the same  way single  crop
esdmations  tend to overstate  .ggregate supply  response). If the export  response  has come  from a
shift of resources  away from food crops  and toward export  crops, then the net increase  in total
agricultural  output  will be lower.
Direct esdmation  of food crop models  in the above  analysis  is not possible  due to a lack of price
data. However,  by replacing  the dependent  variable  in the above  formulation  with food producdon,
it is possible  to test the hypothesis  that export  incentives  lead to offsetting  effects  in food production.
Similarly,  the relationship  between  food  production  and the real exchange  rate can be esdmated.
The results of these models  are shown in table 4.  Three different  dependent  variables  have been
used; total agricultural  production,  total food producdon,  and staple  food production. The estimated
elasticities  indicate  that food  production  responds  positively  to changes  in export  crop producer
prices. Total agricultural  production,  total food production  and staple  food producdon  respond
positively  to changes  in export  crop prices and real exchange  rates. The result  with respect  to the
exchange  rate is expected,  as both tradable  food crops and export  crops are affected  in similar  ways
by exchange  rate distortions.  17i
There is no evidence  of offsetting  changes  between  export and food crops. Even for countries
where the principal  exported  crops are annuals  with high supply  elasticities  of about 0.9, the cross-
price elasticities  on total food or staple  foods  provide  no statistically  significant  evidence  of a trade-
off.  Indeed,  the only statistically  significaint  result is for a positive  cross-price  elasticity  for staple
foods.
There are several  possible  explanations  for the positive  cross-price  effjct of export crop price on
food production: a) food and export  crops may  be complements  in prodaction  (fertilizer  benefits
both crops when  grown together  or in succession),  b) returns on export  production  permit higher
input  use or investment  in food crop production,  or c) a third, omitted,  factor  - such as government
policy that generally  favors agrdiulture  - affects  both export  and food crops in the same  way.  The
results presented  here are consistent  with other empirical  findings  that have found  a positive
correlation  between  expansion  of export  crops and growth  in food  production. One such study
concluded  that "conditions  favoring  agricultural  growth, including  appropriate  economic  policies,
encourage  both cash crop and basic  staple food crop production"  (von Braun  and Kennedy).
17/  To the extent that the REER may  be a proxy for agricultural  terms of trade overall (for both
export  and food crop incentives)  the aggregate  responsiveness  implied  here for total agricultural
production  is an elasticity  of 0.045, which is very close  to the 0.05 estimate  for aggregate  output
in India by Bapna  (reported  in Binswanger).-22-
Table 4.  Regerssion equations for cross-price effect on food production
Independent variables a/
Export crop producer  REER
price
Dependent variable  (2 year moving avg.!  (2  ear moving avg.)
All Countries
Total agricultural production  0.033**  -0.045**
Food production  0.046**  -0.013*0
Staple foods  0.065**  -0.018**
Annual crop Droducinif  countries
Total agricultural production  0.028  -0.110
Food production  -0.016  0.085
Staple foods  0.183*  0.401
*  Statistically significant at  the 95 percent level.
S*  Statistically significant at  the 99 percent level.
Note:  "staple foods" is an aggregate of total production of cereals, roots  and tubers, pulses, oil
crops, bananas, and  plantains in grain equivalent units converted on the basis of their relative
caloric content.
a/  Full model is same as model 1, table 1.
The importance of food production and policy goes beyond its relationship with export
agriculture.  Food policy in Africa differs from export agricultural policy In many respects.  For
this reason, and  due to the more limiting data, food policy and productivity are assessed separately
below.
Food Policv
In only about half the 35 African countries in the sample do governments intervene
substantially in the marketing and pricing of food crops (eleven fewer than  in the 1970s).  In some
of those that do, or did, intervene, government intervention was restricted to marketing of
imported foods, mainly rice or wheat to urban consumers, having indirect effects on domestic
producers.
The effectiveness of government food marketing and pricing policies is difficult to assess
precisely given the paucity of information on  the size and scope of parallel markets in many
African countries.  Among those countries that do intervene to set prices and control marketing,
however, evidence suggests that few do it effectively. Where details are available significant parallel
markets appear to exist.  Zambia appears .o be an exception, where the very high subsidy to
official marketing has prevented much private trade  from developing (Harvey), although there  are
substantial cross-border food movements to neighboring countries. In Zimbabwe, Kenya, and
Botswana, controls are at  least partially successful,  but parallel markets exist. Nevertheless, accounts
differ on the importance of parallel markets in many countries.  For example, in Mali prior to
liberalization, one  account reports that the existence of parallel markets implied free price- 23 -
formation  (Lecaillon  and Morrisson).  And  in Ethiopia  government  confiscation  and restrictions  on
tnsportation  of food affect only certain  regions. I8/
Where data are available  comparisons  of food crop producer  prices to border prices, or NPCs,
show wide swings  from year to year and across countries  (Annex  D table 11). In many countries
producer  prices are higher than  border prices (the NPCs are greater than 1.0) because  of protection
from imports  - due either to government  policies  or high transport  costs which create  natural
barriers. While most of these  countries  import  food, in good  years they may  also export food to
neighboring  countries. In some countries  the net effect on producer  prices is an implicit  subsidy  due
to restrictive  import quotas  (Nigeria, Ghana)  or rationing  of foreign  exchange.
The high transport  costs (annex  D table 7) and year-to-year  swings  in domestic  production  makes
establishing  the level of protection  difficult,  since the food price may fluctuate  within  a wide range
between  export and import  parity prices. As long as the price remains  within  that band, the
influence  of border prices on domestic  market  prices is ambiguous,  and it is unclear whether  the
producer  price should  be compared  to export  or import  par.ty at all for assessing  distortions. In
situations  like this the NPC provides  litte useful information.  12/
Real food price trends
Real producer  prices for food crops have fluctuated  much  less than  for export  crops, except  for a
rise in prices foUowing  the world food shortage  of 1974  (figures  7 and 8), aside from which there is
no perceived  trend on average. The ratio of export  to food crop p;ices, however,  has changed
significantly  over the period, falling from 1970  to 1984  (except  during the commodity  boom in 1975-
79).  OveraUl  the price ratio declined  by about  20 percent  over the period, Since  1984, however,  the
trend  has seen a large reversal, with export crops regaining  their 1970  parity in just two years,
followed  by a small decline  in 1986.
These patterns  have been due to a combination  of exchange  rate, trade, and pricing  policies.
Exchange  rate policies  have discriminated  against  tradable  foods,  driving  down the real prces of
exported  and import competng commodities.  In some cases, however, foreign  exchange  constraints
and import controls  limit imports  and thus may give  rise to somewhat  higher food  prices. The net
effect of these  policies is thus ambiguous. To the extent that domestically  produced  foods  are
nontraded  crops (cassava  and yams) that are imperfect  substitutes,  the appreciation  of the real
exchange  rate may raise their price relative  to traded  food and export  crops.
Trends in consumer  food prices  show that relative  to border prices at official  exchange  rates,
domestically  produced  food crops  became  more  expensive  during the 1970s  (Annex  D table 12)
jJ/  Even with more detailed  information  on the paraUel  markets  in food crops, it would  still be
difficult  to assess the impact  of government  efforts to restrict private trade on producers
incentives. Enforcement  is rare, but where it does occur, and where transporters  are restricted
by law from carrying  food crops, low official  prices  will have some disincendive  effects.
12/  With high transport  costs from producing  region  to border, an NPC (computed  as an import
competing  commodity)  less than one has an inconclusive  interpretation  of the effect  of policy. It
may simply  be that the price has not falen sufficiently  low for the commodity  to become  an
exported  good.-24 -
Figure 7. Real producer  prices  for  major
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relative to imported rice and wheat. Cheaper  imports  resulted  from lower internatdonal  prices and
overvalued  exchange  rates. Trade restrictions  and imperfect  substitution  between  food's  appear  to
have kept  prices of domestically  produced  foods  somewhat  higher.
When traded foods are distinguished  from nontraded  roots and tubers, the trends in the 1980s
illustrate  the effects  of exchange  rate distortions  and changes  in domestic  pricing  policies  (table 5).
As distortions  in real exchange  rates have declined  -- in addition  to food market liberalization  in
some countries  - prices of traded  foods have risen, while  nontraded  food  prices have fallen. This
should have the effect of shifting  demand  toward  domestically  produced  foods  and away from
imports  (discussed  in more  detail  below).
Tale  5.  Comarison of real consumer  food prices in Africa
Indexes
1977-79  1980-82  1985-87
Traded food crops (n= 14)  100  103  112
Nontraded  food crops (n=9)  100  96  89
Overall, food prices  have been affected  less than  export crops  by government  policies  (with a
few notable  exceptions  where  pricing and markedng  are effectively  enforced). This has been
because: a) in many  countries  direct policy  interventions  have  been ineffective,  and b) exchange  rate
policies  have effected  domestic  food  prices less in part because  of trade restrictions  that have limited
imports  of cheap  food.
Food imnort. and slow food  mroductiongrow
Food production  in Africa  has grown  more slowly  than population  since 1970  20/ leading
many  observers  to conclude  that this 'deterioration"  is evidence  of the general  failure of African
agricultural:
"Many African  states  have slowly  lost the capacity  to feed their people"  (Eicher 1986).
"[Africa's] ppoor  performance  has led to a remarkable  increase  in food imports.... The
availability  of food imports  has greatly offset the impact  of poor agidulture performance  on food
security,  but not enough  in aggregate  to ensure an adequate  diet to the average African
(Serageldin)."
20/ Per capita  food production  has fllen at a rate of about 2 percent  per year since 1970-  the
only region  in the world with declining  per capita  food production. At the same  tme Africa  has
become  a net importer of food, doubling  food imports  during  the late-1970s  while food exporu
stagnated. Compounding  these  overall trends are the periodic  and transitory  shortages  and food
insecurity  that affect large mnmbers  of people  in Ethiopia,  Sudan,  Mozambique,  and the Sahelian
countries  most prone to food shortages  over the past 15 years due to drought  or war or both.- 26 -
Consumption  of food, however,  has not declined. Since  the 1960s  average  caloric  consumption  has
been relatively  stable  or rising slightly  in Africa. There has, however,  been a shift in the composition  of
consumption  toward  an higher  share of imported  foods, especially  rice and wheat.
But while imports  have clearly  b-en substituted  for domestic  production,  this leaves open the
question  of the casual  direction  of the shift between  imports  and domestic  supply. Has deterioration  of
productive  capacity  forced  Africans  to import  more food? Or has a shift in demand  in favor of imports
resulted  in declining  demand  for domestically  grown  food (and thus resulting  in slower  growth in
production)?
Demand  for food imports  may rise for several  reasons  independent  of the adequacy  of domestic
supplies. Imported  foods  (generally  rice and wheat)  are imperfect  substitutes  for other, domestically-grown
staples  (millet, sorghum,  maize,  cassava,  and yams). Imported  rice and wheat  tend to be preferred  foods  in
Africa  for reasons  of tastes, social  status, and ease of preparation,  and they tend to exhibit  a high income
elasdcity  of demand  (Delgado). Preference  for imported  foods is most often  manifest  among  urban
populations  in Africa.
As a result, changes  in import  demand  should  result from changes  in the following  variables:  a) the
relative  price of imported  foods  to domestic  foods, b) income, especially  foreign  exchange  earnings,  and c)
demographic  changes  such as urbanization  which would  increase  the share and numbers  of the population
with a high propensity  to consume  imported  foods. Before  testing  these  hypotheses  econometrically,  each is
elaborated  further  below.
The relative  price of imported  to domestic  foods will  be affected  by changes  in international  prices,
exchange  rate policies, changes  in barriers  to trade such as import  restrictions,  and official  domestic  pricing
policies. Exchange  rate policies  wiU  alter the price of domestic  food relative  to imported  foods to the extent
that domestic  food prices  are not fully affected  by international  market  prices. High transportation  costs,
other barriers  to trade, or the lack of international  markets  for staples  such as yams, will make these
products  essentially  nontradable  goods  and therefore  their prces wil rise relative  to imported  food prices as
currencies  become  overvalued. Additionally,  when currencies  are overvalued  governments  generaUy  must
ration  foreign  exchange  and place restrictions  on imports  in order to avoid  exhausting  reserves. These
restrictions  may lead to inefficiencies  in domestic  food production  and marketing  to the extent that it is
dependent  on imported  inputs such as fertilizer, fuel, or fbrm machinery. If, however,  import restrictions
involve  food imports  themselves  (eg. the banning  of food imports  in Nigeria)  then the net effect of exchange
rate distortions  could  be to reduce  food imports,  but orny  a few countries  have implemented  effective  import
restrictions. Domestic  pricing policies  which  discriminate  against  producers  will limit the extent to which
domestic  production  is stimulated  by growth  in demand,  giving  rise to a policy-induced  food gap.  In
addition, consumer  oriented  "cheap  food' policies  will, to the extent that they apply  to imported  foods such
as rice and wheat,  further shift demand  toward  imports  and away from domestically  produced  food.
Higher incomes  wiU  raise consumption,  including  imports. A number  of studies  have observed  a
strong positive  relationship  between  high agricultural  growth and rising food imports  in developing  countries
generaly.  These  studies cite the income  effect of strong agricultural  growth  as leading  to increased  demand
for imported  foods (Bautista). While  few African  countries  fit the category  of having  strong agricultural
growth, a number  have seen periods  of rising incomes  from other sources  over an extended  length  of time
(eg. oil exporters). In particular,  a country's import  capacity,  or the total of export  earnings,  foreig
investment,  borrowing,  and grant aid, wiU  affect demand  for imported  foods overall.
Growth  in urban population  is likely to lead to higher  food imports  if the propensity  to- 27 -
consume imported food is higher among urban dwellers.  This appears to be the case for reasons
of higher urban  incomes, status, and easier and quicker time of preparation (Delgado).  Urban
growth due to rural-to-urban migration is influenced by government policy.  Macroeconomic
policies, pricing policies, and the provision of social services all contribute to shifting the
ruraVurban terms of trade  in favor of urban dwellers and thereby making migration from rural to
urban areas more attractive.  This is likely to increase food impets  due to  higher demand, but
also there  may be a supply-side effect if urban  migration depletes the rural labor force leading to a
decline in domestic production.
Agerereate  pattern  of food imports.  The aggregate patterns of Africa's food imports are presented
in figure 9.  Food imports varied little between 1970 and  1976, ranging between 7-8 million metric
tons.  Over the next four years, however, food imports doubled to more than  14 million tons, and
remained at these high levels until 1986 when they began to  fall gradually.  Surprisingly, the period
during which this sharp  increase occurred was a very favorable period in terms of the weather
pattern  and its effect on cereal yields (except in 1979).  And food aid accounts for less than  10
percent of the increase, although food aid shipments continued to grow in the  1980s raising its
share in the total considerably, especially following the 1982 and  1983 droughts (imports net of
food aid fell to  under  10 million tons by the mid-1980s).
On closer examination of these data, however, one notes that the doubling of Africa's food
imports during this period resulted in large part from events in one country, Nigeria (figure 9).
Indeed, seventy percent of the increase in Africa's food imports -- or about 5 million tons - is
accounted for by changes in Nigeria's imports during that country's oil boom.  Given the events in
Nigeria during that period, a number of contributing factors suggest themselves.  First, oil revenues
resulted in a sharp rise in the nation's income and capacity to import.  Annual import capacity,
defined as export earnings, net borrowing, direct foreign investment, and aid, nearly doubled,
increasing by $14 billion during the same period (figure 10).  Second, the disruptive economic
impact and "dutch disease" effects of the oil boom on  macroeconomic variables resulted in rising
prices and wages, an increasingly  overvalued currency, a shift of labor from traditional agriculture
to industrial and service sectors, and rural-to-urban migration.  All of these factors contributed to
both  rising demand for food imports and a decline in domestic production relative to population.
The changes which were brought about were of such magnitude that for three  of Nigeria's four
major agricultural exports -- peanuts, cotton, and  palm oil -- exports ceased, and in all three cases
Nigeria became a net importer of these commodities by the 1980s.
These  very dramatic changes that occurred in Nigeria -- Africa's largest economy -- are likely
to be indicative of phenomenon at work in other countries, albeit to a lesser degree.  How
generalizable these phenomenon are in explaining Africa's food crisis, is the question to which we
now turn.
Empirical mode.  To test the significance and relative importance of these variables in explaining
changes in Africa's food imports an econometric model is estimated for a sample of 31 countries
with data from 1971 to  1987.  For a sample with these characteristics, pooled cross-section, time-
series analysis was chosed as potentially the most powerful method.  Food imports are regressed on-28  -
Figure 9. Africa's  food imports
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urban population,  the real effective  exchange  rate, import  capacity,  a "weather"  variable,  and trend in the
following  way: 21W
FOOD  IMPORTS  = bo + bjURBAN  POPULATION  + b2REER  +
b3EMPORT  CAPACITY  + B4WEATHER  + BsTREND  +  e
Food imports  are total volume  figures, net of food aid. 22/ URBAN  POPULATION  is an index
based on the total numbers  of urban residents. The REER  is the real effective  exchange  rate as defined  by
the IMF.  It is an index which measures  the evolution  of a country's  prices relative  to those of its trading
partners, adjustment  for nominal  exchange  rate changes. The IMPORT  CAPACITY  is the sum of export
earnings, net borrowing,  foreign  investment,  and grant aid deflated  by Africa's import  price index.
The two variables, WEATHER  and TREND, reflect  the hypotheses  for a supply  side explanation  of
variation  in food imports, which  are unrelated  to prices, policy  variables,  or urbanization. A secularly
increasing  TREND  in food imports  would  support  the hypothesis  that there has been a deterioration  in
Africa's productive  capacity. And  poor WEATHER  (rainfall  as well as tornados  or floods)  that affect
domestic  production  will necessitate  higher  imports. Clear cases of weather-related  causes occurred  during
the period  considered,  including  frequent  severe  drought  between 1973  and 1984. Since 1984  Africa  appears
to have seen more normal rainfall  patterns  on average. The WEATHER  variable  is a proxy derived  from
annual  data on cereal yields  per hectare  for each country. It is esimated as the percentage  deviation  from
trend in cereal  yields over the period.
Empirical  results. Table 6 presents the results of the regression  described  above. All estimates  of the
coefficients  in the equation  agree in sign with a priori expectations. All the explanatory  variables  are
statistically  significant  at the 1 percent  level, except  for the REER  which is significant  at the 5 percent  level.
The estimated  coefficient  and significance  for urban population  indicates  that urban growth  is
strongly  associated  with increased  food imports. This variable  held the strongest  statistical  relationship  in
terms of the addition  to the r-squared  when the variable  was added  to the equation  (using  ordinary  least
squares estimation). The addition  to the r-squared  was  0.237, as compared  to 0.07 for import capacity,  0.05
for the weather  variable, and 0.0017 for the trend.
It should  be recognized  with respect  to the urban population  variable  that the estimated  relationship
may conceal  an underlying,  omitted  variable  which is correlated  to both.  In particular,  government  policies
which alter the rural-urban  terms  of trade in favor of urban consumers  - such as cheap food  policies  - will
simultaneously  encourage  urban consumption  of the subsidized  foods  (generally  these programs  include
imported  rice and wheat)  and urban migration,  which will likewise
21/ Data are from World Bank  and FAO. Data for food imports,  urban population,  and import
capacity  are normalzed  as indexes  to abstract  from country  size (1970-87  average =  100).
L2/ Food aid is excluded  from food imports  because  it is a component  of grant aid and therefore
it would create  an endogeneity  problem  if included  in the right-hand-side  variable, "import
capacity." Also, while emergency  food aid shipments  respond  to domestic  shortfalls  in
production,  increasingly  in the 1980s  the relationship  between  "structural  food aid" shipments
and patterns  of demand  and supply  in Africa  were not obvious.- 30 -
lead to rising food consumption  and imports. Indeed, Zambia,  where cheap  food policies
have been in place for 40 years, has the most urbanized  populaion in Africa.
Table 6.  Regression  euation for Sub-Saharan  Africa's food  imports
Dependent  variable: food imports
variable  Coefficient  t-value
Constant  13.3  (  3.3)**
Urban  population  0.29  (10.7)**
Real exchange  rate  0.06  ( 2. 1)*
Import  capacity  0.40  (21.0)**
Weather  -59.3  (-23.7)**
Trend  1.09  ( 7.4)**
Degree of freedom = 487
Source: World  Bank and FAO.
*  indicates  significance  at the 95 percent level.
**  indicates  significance  at the 99 percent level.
Note: pooled  cross-section  time-series  GLS  method  was used.
An additional  ambiguity  iia  this result is the extent to which  urbanizadon  has affected  domestic
food production  as a result of a reduced  agricultural  labor force. Outmigration  of agricultural  labor
may result  in slower  growth  in production  relative  to overall  population  growth. The upward
pressure of prices for domestic  foods that might result  would further  shift demand  toward  imports.
If, however, producer  food prices are controlled,  or if cheap food imports  or food aid keep  producer
prices low, the price signals  necessary  to stimulate  growth  in domestic  food production  for an
increasingly  urban population  may not ensue. To the extent that this is occurring,  some of the
increase  in food imports  may  be seen as a supply  problem,  but one whose  origins lie in rural to
urban migration  and the policies which  have encouraged  it.
The estimated  coefficient  for the real exchange  rate implies  that exchange  rate policies  have
contributed  to the growth  in Africa's food imports. There are several  ways in which overvalued
exchange  rate will contribute  to food imports. The most direct way is through its effect on the
relative  prices of imported  versus  domestically  produced  foods,  many  of which are nontraded  or
have significant  natural barriers  between  domestic  and international  prices. Thus when  exchange
rates become  overvalued  imported  food  prices will fall relative  to domestic  prices leading  to a shift
in consumption  toward  imported  food. In addition,  overvalued  currencies  are usually  accompanied
by trade and exchange  restrictions  (in order to stem the excess  demand  for foreign  exchange
reserves). This may have the added  effect of reducing  productivity  in domestic  food production  in
cases where food production  relies  on imports  such as fertilizer, fuel and farm machinery. In some
cases, howeve , the accompanying  import restrictions  may also apply  to some imported  foods. If
effective  this would  have the opposite  effect of reducing  food imports. The existence  of such
contradictory  effects may  explain  the lower significance  level for this variable.
The coefficient  for import capacity  is positive  and significant  indicating  an income  effect, oa that
changes  in aggregate  purchasing  power are positively  associated  with changes  in food imports. As
described  above  the vcry large increases  in Nigeria's import  capacity  coincided  with the doubling  of-31  -
Africa's food imports,  70 percent  of which went to Nigeria. Many  other cour. ies were affected  to
a lesser degree by commodity  booms in the late 1970s  for cocoa, coffee,  and phosphates,  as well as
the four other countries  exporting  oil.  And growth  in aid and borrowing  of recycled  OPEC  revenues
raised tae capacity  to import  of many  African  countries  during the late 1970s. By contrast,  the debt
crisis in the 1980s  reduced  substantially  the import  capacity  of many  of these countries.
The weather  variable  (lagged  one year)  is significant  and has the expected  sign: cereal yields
below trend in year t-l are associated  with increased  food imports  in year t.  Despite  the exclusion
of food aid from the dependent  variable,  commercial  food imports  are responsive  to shortfalls  in
domestic  production  caused  by weather-related  factors. Deteriorating  weather,  however, does not
explain the secular  rise in food imports  since  this variable  is in terms of residuals,  or deviations  from
trend, and the trend for most African  countries,  showed  increasing  yields  for cereals  over the period
The trend  variable  is significant  and has the expected  sign. The value of the coefficient  is small,
however, suggesting  a rise in food imports  of only about 1 percent  per year. 23/  In addition,  the
significance  of the variable  in terms  of its addition  to the r-squared  was very small  as reported
above. Nonetheless,  a likely  explanation  for the significance  of a slight trend is the decline  in
international  rice and wheat  prices  over the period, which  would  be expected  to raise imports.
Wheat  prices have falien in real terms  by a third, and rice prices by half, between 1970  and 1986.
Thus, in addition  to the impact  of exchange  rate policies on the relative  prices  of domestic  versus
imported  foods,  border prices  for imported  foods  have fallen over the period, encouraging  additional
substitution  toward imports  in consumption.
Overall, the regression  results provide  important  evidence  that Africa's  food import growth  has
been, in part, demand  driven  rather than  resulting  from failed domestic  production  - although  urban
migration  and trade and exchange  restrictions  are likely to have  had an effect on supply  as well.
Demand  has been influenced  by go urnment  policies,  urbanization,  and import  capacity.
Urbanization  is the strongest  explanatory  factor. But government  policies,  to the extent they account
for differences  in rates of urban migration,  under the strong  relationship  ateributed  to urbanization.
Evidence  of that link is presented  below.
Policy  and rural-urban  migration
The link between  policies  and the rate of rural-urban  migration  has only been imprecisely
identified  thus far.  Governments  affect the rate of rural-urban  migration  through  macroeconomic
and pricing policies  that alter the domestic,  or rural-urban  terms of trade.  These  include  exchange
rate policies and cheap  food policies, both of which  generally  discriminate  against  the rural sector.
In addition, govermnent  programs  such  as the provision  of schools,  health service,  and water
supplies,  may favor urban locations  thereby  encouraging  migration. But determining  the extent of
these influences  is problematic  due to poor census  data and the gradual  nature of these  demographic
shifts. Anecdotal  evidence  provides  some support  to the importance  of these  policies  on
urbanization. For example,  Zambia,  which  has had highly subsidized  cheap  food policies  for more
than  40 years, has the highest  share of urban  population  in Sub-Saharan  Africa.
2D  Although  not expressed  precisely  as a growth  rate, the dependent  variable  is an index  with
an average value of 100  for the entire period. Thus a coefficient  of 1 can be taken  as
approximating  a 1 percent per year trend.- 32 -
Only with large changes  in policy  variables  would  one expect  observable  shifts in the rate (or
even the direction)  or rural-urban  migration. Some  observers  contend  that in several countries  such
as Ghana, Nigeria,  and Tanzania,  where  profound  policy changes  altered  the domestic  terms  of trade
in favor of the rural sector, urban dwellers  are returning  to the farm. Because  of poor demograplhic
data, however,  these patterns  have been difficult  to substantiate.
In the case of Ghana,  however, recent survey  data from the World Bank's Ghana  Living
Standards  Measurement  Survey  offers an opportunity  to authenticate  the pattern more concretely. In
a survey  of over 8,000 individuals  in Ghana,  information  on current  and prior employment  was
collected. From this data, respondents  were broken down  by principal  occupation  into agricultural
and non-agricultural,  and similarly  for previous  occupation. For those who  changed  occupations
between  mid-1984  and 1988  - the time  of the survey  -- prior and current  occupation  was tabulated
as shown  in table 7.
Table 7.  Rural-urban  migration  in Ghana since  structural  adiustment
(principal  occupation  1984-88,  in percent)
Current  Occupation
Agriculture  Non-agriculture  Total
Peius  ocMuation
Agriculture  63  2  65
Non-agriculture  4  31  35
Total  67  33  100
Source: Ghana Uving Standards  Survey (World  Bank).
Note: sample  size = 5570
These  data reveal a significant evre  migration  from urban (or nonagricultural)  to rural
(agricultural)  occupations  since  the reform  program  was initiated  in the early 1980s. Among
individuals  that have changed  occupations  during  the period, those moving  from nonagricultural  into
agriculture  outnumber  those moving  in the opposite  direction  two-to-one. Given the proportions  of
the rural and urban populations  as a whole (and assuming  it is roughly  the same  for the agricultural-
to-nonagricultural  breakdown)  these data indicate  a two-percent  net increase  in the share of the
population  earning  a living in agriculture  since 1984. This contrasts  with aggregate  data prior to
1984  indicating  migration  in the other direction  at about 1 percent  per year.  The impact  of this
reversal  on productivity  of both food and export  agriculture  appears  to have been considerable: In
the late 1980s  Ghana  substantially  improved  food production  and dramatically  increased  cecoa
exports  (figure 17 below).
These data confirm  what many observers  have suspected  or observed  anecdotally;  that
government  policy  has a profound  effect  on migration  from rural to urban areas. As a corollary,
these  policies  have also had an important  effect, both directly  and indirectly,  on the growth in
Africa's food imports.33 -
IV.  DIVERSITY  WITHIN AFRICA:
POLICY ENVIRONMENT  AND AGRICULTURAL  PERFORMANCE
The pattern  for individual countries will vary from the average relationships described above.
And the responsiveness of agriculture to changes in price and nonprice variables will certainly
differ across countries.  To some extent this will depend on  the type of policies pursued, whether
farmers anticipate policy changes to be permanent or temporary, as well as structural factors such
as the state of transport and other infrastructures.  Recent debate on  the effectiveness of policy
reforms and adjustment programs has focused both  on what evidence there is to indicate that these
programs are working, and on to what extent can one expect adjustment programs to be equally
effective in different countries.
To try to address these two questions, and to provide evidence complementary to the patterns
and  results above, this section will examine the patterns for countries grouped according to  their
policy environment, and  it will examine a  number of individual countries as well.  The emphasis on
the comparison of country groupings is to discern evidence of divergent trends between those
countries pursuing policy reform programs and those that do  not.
Comparing performance in favorable versus unfavorable policy environment
One approach to addressing the importance of the policy environrent  empirically is to
compare the performance of countries that have pursued policies favorable to agriculture, with that
of countries whose policies have been less favorable to agriculture.  Although the set of domestic
policies which impinge on  the agricultural sector differs by country, key policy variables can be
used to create this typology.  The approach taken here  is to compare countries which have
maintained or adopted a  policy environment favorable to  the agricultural sector.  The classification
is based primarily on  two variables, exchange rate policies and producer pricing policies.  Thus, by
examining 1) the extent of exchange rate distortion - revealed in the real exchange rate and  the
ratio of parallel market exchange rate to official rates -- and 2) the trends in real prices paid to
produceis as well as the nominal protection coefficient, the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have
been classified as those with a  Favorable Policy Environment (FPE), and  those with Unfavorable
Policy Environments (UPE) which hinder or discriminate against agriculture.  The classification and
criteria used are given in Annex C.
Differential performance between groups.  The comparisons in table 8 indicate that since the early
1980s the countries with favorable policies have performed better  than  those with unfavorable
policies.  This has been true in agriculture, and  in terms of overall economic growth as weLL
Between 1982 and  1988, agricultural exports and agricultural value-added rose in FPE countries
4.15 percent and 3.50 percent per year, respectively,  while both of these indicators declined in UPE
countries.  Total agricultural production grew nearly three  times as fast in FPE countries, and  food
production grew nearly 4 times as fast, as was the case in the UPE countries.  Given the
importance of agriculture and its linkages to other  sectors, it is not surprising that overall GDP
also grew faster in FPE countries -- at  3.25 percent per year --  over the  1982-88  period.  SinceTable &8 Comparison of gerformance and policy amone African county  erouns.
Countries with  . favorable policies  Countries with unfavorable policies
average  average  growth rate  average  average  growth rate
198082  198548  198248  1980482  1985488  198248
Economic Performance
Volume of agricultural exports a/cf  99.1  121.5  4.15  101.8  102.8  -1.80
Total agricultural production a/  104.2  118.3  2.55  102.9  109.1  0.89
Food production  103.9  116.5  2.33  103.3  107.7  0.62
Agricultural Value-added a/c/  101.5  119.7  3.50  101.7  99.4  -0.91
Gross domestic product a/  103.9  125.6  3.25  104.1  118.4  2.14
Polc  Performance
Real effective exchange rate b/  133.0  95.6  -9.4  168.2  112.4  -5.3
Real producer prices for exports a/cl  94.3  104.9  4.37  95.8  96.5  0.85
Nominal protection coefficient
(export commodities) c/  0.84  1.14  0.96  0.99
Real protection coefficient
(export commodities) c/  0.65  1.12  0.75  0.97
Food Sector
Real producer food price cd  98.4  100.6  104  108
Nominal protection coefficient
(tradeable foods) d/  2.9  1A  0.74  1.27
Real protection coefficient
(tadeable  foods) d/  1.18  1.97  0.63  1.03
Food imports cl  106  133  5.5  112  160  4.5
ogenous  Factors
Index of export prices a/  99.1  87.1  97.8  89.8
Weather effect  -0.06  0.05  0.02  -0.05
a/  Index, 1979-81 =  100.
b/  Index, 1970-75  =  100.
c/  Period is 1985-87  only, no  1988 data are available.
d/  Periods are  1981-83,  and 1987 only.  Reduced samples are 6 and 4 for FPE and UPE, respectively.- 35 -
1984, growth  in the FPE countries  has exceeded  population  growth  ior all the performance  variables
mentioned  above. The divergent  trends are illustrated  in figures 11-14. 24/
The policy  variables  in table 8 mirror the way the countries  were classified: PPE countries  have, on
average, reduced  real effective  exchange  rates rapidly  since 1982, nearly twice  as fast as the UPE countries,
and to a level lower than during the early 1970s  whereas  for the UPE countries' the REER  remains 12
percent  higher than  in the early 1970s  (figure 15). 2S/
With respect  to direct policies  affecting  agricultural  incentives,  the average  nominal  protection
coefficient  for major export  crops in FPE countries  rose to 1.14 by 1985-87  from a level of 0.84 in the early
1980s. In UPP.  countries  the NPC rose as well, but by a lesser amount,  to 0.99. Since  the NPC does not
account  for the indirect  effects of exchange  rate disturtions,  the real protection  coefficients  (RPCs)  are
compared  between  the two groups. They indicate  that in the early 1980s,  producer. in FPE countries  were
faced  higher rates of implicit  taxation  than did those in UPE countries. Since  that time the pattern has
shifted  in favor of producers  in FPE countries  as the RPCs for that group rose 70 percent. 2AI
For the FPE group, the level of RPC in 1985-87  indicates  some  degree of subsidization  to
producers. Indeed, among  CFA countries,  governments  have  been unwilling  to reduce producer  prices in
the face of the decline  in the French franc denominated  prices  of their major commodity  exports. This has
for example  resulted  in an RPC of 2.56 for Senegal,  and 1.15 for Cote D'Ivoire.
Exogenous  factors  and shocks. Exogenous  factors  such as better weather  patterns  or higher demand  for a
country's  exports could  potentially  explain  some or all of the differential  performance  observed  here.  To
assess that possibility  both a weather  variable,  and export  prices are compared  for the two groups  of
countries. In the case of export  prices, the data suggest  that export  prices facing  both groups  of countries
have fallen by similar magnitudes.
To assess the impact  of rainfall, the weather  variable  defined  in Section  2 is used: deviation  from
trend  in cereal  yields. Those residuals  (in logarithms)  are compared  in table 1 for the two groups  of
countries. They indicate  that, on average, FPE countries  did indeed  receive  more favorable  weather  during
1985-87,  but faired somewhat  worse in the early 1980s  (figure 16).
Can the differences  in performance  between  the two groups  be explained  by the better weather
experienced  by the FPE countries? This quesdon  can  be answered  in a precise way. Since  the
relationship  between  the weather  variable  and exports  was esimated in table 1, it was also
esimated with respect  to total production  and food.  Based  on the esdmated  coefficients  of the
24/  Performance  varied witin  the two groups. Not all FPE countries  performed  better than all
UPE countries,  but in the case of agricultural  value added,  for example,  of the 12 countries  with
growth  rates above  2 percent, 9 were FPE countries;  of the 11 countries  with growth  rates below
2 percent  9 were UPE countries. For agricultural  exports the dispersion  overlapped  more; in
fact Senegal,  a FPE country,  had the worst performance  with -12 percent growth  for 1982-87.
2JI  This improvement  for FPE countries  occurred  in spite  of an increase  in REERs  by CFA
countries  of about 1 percent  per year from 1982-87.
2I  The actual  level of the "real" protection  coefficient  may  be misleading  if the real exchange
rate was distorted  in the base year. Attention,  therefore, should  be focused  on the change  over
time and difference  between  the NPC and the "real"  protection  coefficient.-36  -
Figure 11,  Africa's  agricultural  exports
Comparing countries grouped by favorable
and unfavorable policy environments
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Figure 12. Total agricultural  production
Comparing countries  grouped by favorable
and unfavorable policy environments
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Figure 13. Total food production
Comparing countries  grouped by favorable
and unfavorable policy environments
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Figure 14. Africa's GDP
Comparing countries  grouped by favorable
and unfavorable policy environments
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Figure 15. Real effective  exchange  rates
Comparing countries  grouped by favorable
and unfavorable policy environments
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Figure 16. Weather patterns  in Africa
Comparing countries grouped by favorable
and unfavorable policy environments
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regressions  in table 1, only about  one-third  of the differences  in export  growth  between  the two groups or
countries  can be attributed  to differences  in rainfall. 27/
The comparisons  in table 9 also indicate  that both food and total agricultural  production  grew faster
since 1982  in countries  with favorable  agricultural  policies  - with food production  growing  nearly four times
as fast in FPE countries  as in UPE countries. Again,  based on the coefficients  estimated  for their response
to better weather,  only about  one-third  of the difference  can be attributed  to the different  weather  patterns.
It is noteworthy  that for those countries  where producer  food price data are available  (excluding
official  prices where they are not enforced)  there  has been very little change  in the real prices paid to
producers  for food crops. Again the earlier results are confirmed:  improved  prices for export  crops tend to
benefit  food production  as well.
County diversity:  policy and response
While the patterns  in many individual  countries  support the aggregate  results and grouped
comparisons  above, performance  and responsiveness  varies  across countries  within  the two groups. Aside
from differentiation  between  annual  and tree crops, two major reasons  can account  for differing
responsiveness  to price signals: first, if price changes  are viewed  as temporary  fluctuations  rather than
permanent  shifts  in the price policy  regime, farmers  will not respond; second,  nonprice  constraints  may
obstruct  producers  from responding  to incentives.
The experience  of several  countries  provides  eviderce of both responsive  and nonresponsive
agriculture. Ghana is a striking  example  of both how deleterious  the effects  of bad economnic  policies can
be, and how changing  those poor policies  can have a dramau^-.  effect for agriculture  and for the economy
overall. GDP has grown  by 6 percent  per year since 1983,  led by rhe agriculural sector. Agricultural
exports  (essentially  cocoa), which  had been falling  since the 1960s,  have finally  rebounded,  3-4 years after
real producer  prices were nearly doubled  (figure 17).
There are many reasons  for the inpressive response  of Ghana's economy. Included  among  these  are
the return of expelled  workers  from Nigeria  at the time of the reforms  bringing  additional  labor to the rural
sector, high levels of international  assistance  which  enabled  the government  to persevere  in the difficult
adjustment  programs, and the ostensible  perception  that the reforms represented  a permanent  change  in
Ghana's policy  regime. A survey  carried out in early 1988  showed  a substantial  amount  of new cocoa
planting  was taking  place, an investment  whose  return will depend  on producer  prices at least four years
hence. The credibility  of the change  in price level had been perceived  (accurately  thus far) to be a
permanent  change  and thus led to revision  of the prices exocte  by farmers  in the future, not just current
prices.
In addition,  though, despite  a long period  of deteriorating  economic  conditions,  the physical  and
institutional  infrastructure  needed  to service  the cocoa  sector  had remained  reasonably  intact.
22/ Using  the estimate  of the export  supply  response  to changes  in the weather  variable,  only 4
percentage  points of the 22 percent growth  over the period can be explained  by more favorable
weather. Similarly,  for the UPE group which  experience  poor weather  during part of the
period, their exports  could  have been 3 percentage  points  better than the 1 percent  rise between
the two periods  if weather  had remained  favorable  in the second  period. Therefore,  7 of the 21
percentage  point difference  in growth  between  the two groups  is accounted  for by different
weather. (Similar  results are obtained  by comparing  the differences  :n total production  and food
production.)-40  .
Figure 17.  Ghana's price incentives and
agricultural exports
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Figure 18. Zaire's price incentives and
agricultural exports
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Some roads are in need of repair, but for the most  part the capacity  existed  to support  the response
in the sector. These  nonprice  factors  were, in Ghana's case, not as limiting  to agricultural  response
as may be the case elsewhere. Togo  also provides  an example  where agriculture  has been responsive
to incentives  (figure  20).
By contrast, Zaire is a case where policy  reform led to strong policy  changes,  but had little effect
on production. The improvement  in incentives,  however, was shortlived  (figure 18), and to the
extent that producers  (correctly)  viewed  the change  transitory  rather than  a credible  shift in policy
regime, they were unresponsive  to the change. The potendal  responsiveness  of agriculture  in Zaire
is less clear for other reasons. The interior transport  network,  as well  as support  services  to
agriculture  were never as well developed  as in Ghana, and they  have deteriorated  considerably. The
loss of this infrastructure,  combined  with the policies  that weighed  heavily on taxation  of agriculture,
resulted  in a degeneration  to essentially  subsistence  agriculture.  Recent  analysis  of the situation  in
Zaire refers to a labor shortage  in the rural areas due to low returns  to agriculture,  lack of consumer
goods, and cheap food policies  favoring  the urban areas: quite simply  agriculture  will not respond  to
price incentives  if few people  live in rural areas!
Similar  to Zaire in many respects,  Tanzania  provides  another  example  of disappointing  response
to policy reforms. While the policy  distortions  over the past 20 years have  been very severe
(Lofchie),  recent policy  reforms  in Tanzania  have resulted  in little response  from agriculture. There
appear  to be two main reasons  for this.  First, the reforms  have  yet to result in sustained
improvements  in the incentives  facing  producers. Exchange  rate distortions  remain, and real
producer  prices have not improved  (figure 19). For investment  to occur  in agriculture,  prices
mMr&k4  in the future  must be revised. If even crrnt  prices  have not risen, it is unlikely  to change
behavior. Secondly,  the physical  infrastructure  had decayed  substantially  in Tanzania,  leaving  many
producers, or potential  producers,  without  easy access  to the markets  that are intended  to foster
incentives.
Many observers  have remarked  at the striking  differences  in performance  between  Kenya  and
Tanzania. The differences  are clearly related  to differences  in policy. Kenya's coffee  and tea
growers  have enjoyed  high percentages  of their crops international  price (NPCs  have averaged  0.9
for both), although  this leaves  farmers  vulnerable  to wide  year-to-year  swings  in th"  prices they
receive. Nevertheless,  there has been steady  growth  in export  volumes  of both crops.
Land  policy in Kenya, and the Ujaama  policy  in Tanzania  are just two additional  factors  that
enter into understanding  the sources  of the two countries  differences.  The complexities  of the
differences  and similarities  of these two countries  are, however.  impossible  to summarize
briefly. 21/  One key difference,  though, is the identification  of key constituencies  for policy
making:  Kenya's farmer elites, and Tanzania's  urban elite. In Kenya, the elite  has financially
invested  in rural areas, often  deriving  an important  portion  of its income  from agriculture. Their
influence  has undoubtedly  been a factor in the consistent  policy  environment  that has favored
agriculture.
By contrast,  the Tanzanian  government  nationalized  the land, making  it virtually  impossible  for
agricultural  systems  based on private ownership  to develop,  and the government's  leadership  code
21/ See Michael  Lofchie, 1989.  The Policy  Factor: Agricultml Performance  in Kenya and
Tanzania  for a recent  analysis  of the economic  and political  issues.- 42 -
Figure 19. Tanzania's  price incentives
and agricultural exports
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"framed and implemen-e'S  by politicians whose political and economic base was exclusively
urban.  Tanzania's agn  -Itural policies thus provide one of Africa's clearest examples of a
system designed to trans  ;r economic resources from the countryside to the city  (Lofchie, p.
191).
Indeed, many of the African countries where agriculture has been favored and as a  result
performed well, are countries where influential elites have vested interests in the agricultural sector:
Kenya, Malawi, and  Zimbabwe, are all countries with large-scale farms owned by influential
citizens.  By contrast, in the majority of African countries where the sector is made up almost
entirely of smallholder farmers with little or no political voice, agriculture has been disadvantaged
in favor of the influential urban class.
This adds a confounding factor to the arguments in favor of a broadly-based smallholder
development strategy versus a "bimodal" strategy including larger, estate  type farms.  While the
economic arguments for smallholder-based strategies are persuasive (Johnston  1982), one sees in
recent experience that they have tended to be politically disadvantaged and suffered as a result.  By
contrast, where there  is an elite with vested interest in agriculture there appears to have been a
powerful voice supporting the interest of farmers.  Does the importance of assuring a political
lobby outweigh the economic arguments for unimodal development?  Have the large-scale
landholders lobbied for their interests only, at  the expense of smaUholders?  In some cases, there
has been a discriminatory influence that has protected the interests of the large-scale farmers,
sometimes at  the expense of the smallholder, as in the cases of Malawi and Zimbabwe.
V.  CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Summary of Empirical Findings
The analysis above supports the following conclusions:
1.  The decline in Africa's agricultural exports production between 1970 and the early-
1980s coincided with substantial and widespread macroeconomic policy distortions and
deteriorating real prices paid to  agricultural producers.  Detailed econometric analysis indicates
that agricultural exports have, overall, been depressed by direct and  indirect price distortions.
The effects have been substantial; aggregate patterns indicate that as both real producer prices
and real exchtange  rates deteriorated by about 20 percent on average during the  1970s,
agricultural exports declined by a  similar percentage.
2.  Beginning in the early 1980s, policy reforms and macroeconomic adjustments have
reduced the degree of direct and indirect policy distortion giving rise to improvements in
overall agricultural export performance.  The estimates of supply responsiveness confirm the
relationship between improved policies and better  growth.  Moreover, countries that have
adopted or maintained favorable policy environments since 1984 have seen higher agricultural
production, exports, and overall economic growth than countries with less favorable policies.
3.  The degree of policy distortion in Africa differs from other developing countries
primarily with respect to exchange rate distortions rather than in direct pricing policy. The
degree of direct pricing policy intervention, as measured by the rates of nominal protection,
have been significant in many African countries, but they have not been significantly larger than
in other developing countries.  The degree of ex.change  rate overvaluation, however, has been- 44 -
larger, resulting in a  loss of competitiveness and leading to  inefficiencies,  including those arising
from the exchange and  trade controls that usually accompany overvaluathon.
4.  The response of export agriculture to policy changes has not come by way of shifting
resources out of food production.  Econometric analysis indicate that  food production, like
exports, responds positively to improvements in real exchange rates.  Moreover, food production
correlates positively with higher producer prices for export crops, suggesting either  that  they are
complements in production, that  policies favorable to export agriculture also favor food
producers, or that  a third, omitted, variable is correlfr-4 with both improved policy and output.
5.  Urban migration has been both a symptom of policy distortions and a cause of poor
agricultural performance.  In many African countries, macroeconomic imbalances, declining real
producer prices, "cheap food policies", and other  policies favoring urban dwellers have shifted
the rural-urban terms of trade significantly  against the rural sector.  This has led to a  shift of
productive resources out of agriculture and  has resulted in high rates of urban  migration.
Policy reforms that  realign the internal terms of trade can slow, or reverse, these resource
flows.  This has been documented in Ghana wh-re substantial reverse migration to the
agricultural secto.  has been occurring since the implementation of their recovery program.
6.  Africa's food imports doubled during the late  1970s, making Africa a net food impolter
for the first time.  In the aggregate, however, this 7 million metric ton increase in annual
imports is almost entirely accounted for by two factors:  a) seventy percent of the increase is
due  to a quadrupling of Nigeria's food imports during the oil boom when its "capacity to
import" tripled; and b) food aid to Africa increased from annual levels of 1 million metric tons
per year to around 4 million metric tons, accounting for most of the remaining increase.
7.  At  the country level, rising food imports have not resulted from a failure of African
agriculture (yields per  hectare have, in general, been rising).  Slow growth in domestic food
production in Africa is primarily the result of urban migration, the availability of cheap food
imports, and  a tendency among urban dwellers to consume imported rice and wheat.  This has
resulted in a reduction in the demand for domestically produced foods, which, along with the
outmigratiun of agricultural labor, has led to supply and demand for domestic production
growing more slowly than population.  Econometric analysis indicates that  the most important
factors explaining rising food imports are: a) chianges  in the strcture  of demand (due to
demographic and  income changes related to urbanization), b) changes in the ability to  pay
(foreign exchange earnings or "capacity to import"), and c) relative prices (due to  the
overvaluation of c'irrencies which have made imported foods relatively cheap).  Most of the
variation in food imports can be explained by these factors.  The remaining trend in food
imports is only about a  1 percent annual increase, which is likely the  result of the substantial
drop in international rice and wheat prices between 1970-86.
Taken together, these conclusions place much of the blame for  the deterioration of African
agriculture on  government policies which have shifted the internal terms of trade strongly against
agriculture and created market distortions that reduced efficiency. The result was a shift of
resources -- especially labor -- out of the sector, and a decline in both private and public
investment.- 45 -
Forward Looking Issues
The prescription that  follows from these findings should not be one of limiting the focus of
attention  to price policy.  But rather it should be clear that the elimination of policy distortions
sets the stage for getting on with strengthening the real sources of long-term agricultural growth:
productive investment and technological change.  In addition to  investments by private agents,
public investments in physical, human and institutional capital are essential such as transport
infrastructure, support  services, and agricultural research.  All of these seek to raise productivity
and reduce the cost of production to make agriculture more competitive.
In specific countries, prices may appear to be less important than  nonprice factors; where price
policies have not led to  major distortions, attention  should rightly be placed on promoting
productive private and public investments.  Where price distortions have been large and as a result
agriculturai investments neglected, both  price and nonprice constraints are likely to be binding, but
romoving price distortiens should be seen as a prerequisite to encouraging appropriate investments
in the sector.
The debate over the relative importance of price and nonprice factors is to some degree
misguided, or at  least misleading.  There are three  reasons for this.  First, nonprice constraints on
the responsiveness of agriculture may be interpretable as being price-related (i.e., the lack of roads
is a transport  cost which will reduce the farmgate price; the absence of extension services raises
information costs making technology prohibitively expensive to most farmers).  Second, the relative
importance of these two categories clearly differs across countries.  Therefore, the debate should
rightly take place only within a specific country context.
And third, nonprice constraints in many cases may be a reflection of the very slow speed of
adjustment for investments, maintenance, migration, and the attention of government to provide
supporting services, in response to potentiaUy profitable agricultural activities.  In the absence of
price incentives, it will do little good to relieve nonprice constraints.  In fact, it should be difficult
to  identify them without proper price signals (in the extreme, it does little good to build roads to
rural areas if nobody lives there anymore).
In many cases constraints exist which inhibit a swift response of farmers to changes in prices.
But bad  roads, lack of irrigated land, and nonexistent input suppliers can be seen as the result of
neglected investments in the face of unprofitable choices.  The point here mirrors the dicotomy
between short-run and (very) long-run supply response.  In the same way that  planting cocoa trees
is a long-run investment decision by a farmer in response to expectations of future profitability,
public funds for roads, storage facilities, or establishing institutional support  reflect public sector
responses to future returns on  investment.  In this way, the very long-run supply response includes
"induced institutional change."  Indeed, it should be clear that  the highly developed physical and
institutional infrastructure of Kenya's coffee sector would not have developed if pricing and
exchange rate policies had been strongly adverse.  The iasults presented here makc a case for the
importance of reducing price policy distortions.  Viewed in this way, it should be seen as a
necessary but not sufficient condition for agricultural growth.-46-
ANNEX  A - DATA  AND METHODOLOGY
Time-series data for official and market prices were compiled from a variety of sources
including World Bank and IMF documents, consultant's reports, the  FAO, the USDA, the
International Federation of Agricultural Producers, and direct contacts with World Bank Resident
Missions and country economists. 22/
Producer and consumer price data have been compiled for the most important agricultural
commodities in each of 35 countries; for up to four majot export commodities, up to three  traded
food crops, and up to  two nontraded  staples.
Data  for agricultural production and trade are from FAO.  National accounts data are from the
World Bank data files and IMP.  Transport costs per  kilometer-ton have been estimated based on
the  large number of existing detailed studies, and are applied to distances from the major
producing and consuming region for each commodity via the most commonly used mode.
Historical transport cost data, where unavailable, are extrapolated on the basis of the domestic CPL
Processing costs have been estimated similarly.  Ocean freight costs are estimated based on World
Bank figures.
The critical distinction between official prices and open market or parallel market prices has
been maintained throughout.  Where the available information indicates that most farmers receive
the official price for their product, that price is also assumed to ba the market price.  '.Vhere data
on  open or parallel market prices are available these prices are used as being more representative
of what producers receive.  Averages across countries for export or food crops are taken as
weighted averages (by production value) within countries, and simple averages across country
groups. 2Q/
For comparative analysis between country groups, group averages are simple means.  Weighted
averages would be inappropriate since the objective is to illuminate a central tendency among
countries in the group, rather than  to assess their aggregate magnitude.
The producer price data assembled are deflated by the domestic CPI for up to four major
export commodities in each country.  An average index of export producer prices is computed
weighing each commodity's price by its relative value of total production.
The following potential data problems should be borne in mind when interpreting the results of
this study:
1.  Production data and, to a lesser extent, export data, may be inaccurate.  Export data be
29/ In general, the producer price data reflect the average annual price received by farmers in the
most important  producing regions, although due to the wide regional and seasonal variations and
the lack of specifics from some sources, this level of precision cannot be assured.  Data series from
different sources have sometimes been spliced when they seemed reasonably consistent.
L /  Detailed data on producer prices was compiled for 35 countries, excluding very small countries
(Comoros, Seychelles,  Cape Verde, Sao Tome, Lesotho, Swaziland), ones where no data were
available (Angola), or where agriculture is of minor importance in the overall e.nmomy (Gabon,
Djibouti).
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biased when shifts in the share of unreported or smuggled exports changed.  This could have
resulted in an positive bias in the results above.
2.  The producer price data have been carefully compiled to distinguish between official
prices and actual producer prices where divergences were apparent.  Nevertheless, 'he prices
used are for most countries officially reported prices and  in some cases will not accurately
reflect what farmers are being paid.
3.  The index of producer prices computed is based on from 1 to 4 export crops per
country.  For countries where the composition of exports includes significant other crops, the
price incentives are omitted from the analysis, while their export volumes are included.
4.  Changes in input prices have been ignored.  To the extent that producers are
responding to changes in farm profits, changes in fertilizer and other  prices should be taken
into account.  Typically,  higher output prices and devaluation have been associated with raising
the  prices for imported inputs such as fertilizer.  To the extent that this phenomenon has been
omitted from the above analysis, the elasticities with respect to price and exchange rate have
been biased downward.
5.  There are simultaneity problems for countries where their exports account for a sizable
hare of inteational  nmarkets  anid face less than perfectly elastic demand (Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire,
Nigeria, Kenya, Cameroon).  This problem could bias the results downward. For countries
where the farm price reflects the highly variable international price (coffee in Kenya and
Ethiopia, tobacco in Malawi), occasional sharp increases in price will not affect current
production decisions, and will be viewed and temporary in nature.  This may partly explain the
low, or negative, results for these three countries.-48  -
ANNEX B - THE EXTENT OF CHRONIC HUNGER IN AFRICA
At  the heart of any analysis of food policy in Africa is a concern over the welfare of African
people who live in a harsh environment, where rainfall is erratic and where several regions have
been prone to drought, especially in the past  15 years.  Africa's famines in drought or war prone
areas such as Ethiopia, Sudan, Mozambique, and the Sahel, require emergency respoases and better
global preparedness for the future.  But these emergency situations, now referred to as "transitory"
food insecurity (World Bank 1986a) are different from the issue of chronic hunger or  food
insecurity, where people suffer from a continuously inadequate diet caused by inability to acquire
food.
There are, however, relatively few reliable statistics with which to asses the  prevalence and
magnitude of chronic hunger in Africa.  In Africa and in other developing countries food
availabilities are estimated using food balance sheet techniques which estimate availability as a
residual, introducing errors which are almost invariably in the direction of understatement.  In a
thorough analysis of the statistics and methods quantifying nutritional situations, Poleman
concluded that
"With food availability  estimates .hat understated set against requirement figures that
overstated, the cards were so stacked that almost all LDCs could be classified as "diet
deficit."  Redone with truly accurate information, it is probable that few countries would he
so classified.  Much as the protein gap proved a statistical illusion, the list of diet-deficient
countries would be whittled away." (Poleman, p.15)
Given the weaknesses in the data, and their likely biases, the case being made about Africa's
chronic food problem, that  "average  daily caloric intake was 96 percent of requirements in the
1980s"  seems a remarkably weak basis on which to assert that the "inadequacy  of food manifests
itself both  at a national level and at the household and individual lever  (Serageldin).
The principal evidence that  may indicate widespread undernutrition comes from dietary and
anthropometric studies showing that  a large share of children in Sub-Saharan Africa are stunted.
Stunting, however, can result from several causes, including diseases which lead to  reduced intake
of food and impair the metatolism  and absorptive capacity of the individual.  And there  is a
growing consensus among nutritionists that both disease and lidernutrition  can result in stunting,
as weU as child morbidity and mortality.  In fact, over the past 20 years the infant and child
mortality rates have not dropped  more in African countries where aggregate food supplies have
increased, than  in the countries where food supplies have declined (Svedberg).
In a systematic assessment of available evidence Svedberg (1987) concludes that  "there is no
firm evidence of widespread and severe undernutrition in the African population at large  (p. 87).
But certain  patterns observable in Africa seems at odds with tlue o  onclusion that  "about a
quarter of Africa's population ... do not consume enough food to alowv  an active working life
(World Bank 1988a). The high rate and continuation of rural-urban migration, the growing
importation of rice and wheat that in many countries is more costly that domestic cereals, and
depressed market prices following abundant harvests suggesting market saturation, are difficult to
reconcile with the assertion that  in many of these countries 30 to 40 percent of the population are
chronicaly  "food insecure."
However, even with adequate "average" food availabilities, chronic hunger may persist if poverty,
income distribution, and other factor prevent certain groups from obtaining enough food.  These- 49 -
are issues that  need more careful unalysis and attention.  The evaluations by Poleman and Svedberg
suggest that available data overstate the extent of chronic undernutrition, and that reports including
strong statementt  about the severity of the problem have no  reliable empirical basis.  Clearly, what
is needed is better  data and more focused analysis on the extent of the problem and its causes.- 50 -
ANNEX C - CLASSIFICATION  OF COUNTRIES  BY POLICY ENVIRONMENT
For comparative purposes countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have been classified into two groups
based on the policy environment that existed in the mid- to late-1980s.  The principal
considerations for classification of countries are the direct policies that affect agricultural incentives
(the real producer prices, levels of direct taxation i.e. NPC), and indirect policy measures which
affect the competitiveness of the agricultural sector vis-a-vis other sectors in the economy and in
international markets (real exchange rate).
On the basis of criteria for these key policy variables the countries were classified as shown in
the table below as having a  Favorable Policy Environment (FPE) or as having an Unfavorable
Policy Environment (UPE).  This classification differs in several respects from that used recently in
(Africa's Adjustment and Growth in the  1980s (World Bank 1989) to compare "strong reforming"
and "weak reforming" countries.  Policy reform programs differ among countries and, given the
kinds of policy changes undertaken they may or may not be expected to have any relatively short-
run impact on  economic performance overall, or agricultural performance in particular.  For
example, reforms in public enterprises, govemment revenue collection, or reduction of government
payrolls are all measures that at least partly share the goal of alleviating fiscal imbalances, to
reduce deficit financing through money creation that is inflationary, and thereby lead to lower
inflation, positive real interest rates, and better  allocation of investments to promote efficient
growth.  These measures have longer-term objectives and therefore cannot be expected to affect
productivity in the economy or in the agricultural sector over a  five year period.
In addition, the categories of "strong"  and "weak"  reforming countries rely on  formal agreements
with Bretton Woods institutions as the criteria for being considered "strong reforming", rather  than
by having these reform programs manifested in objective policy performance indicators such as the
real exchange rate or level of agricultural taxation.  As a result of this different approach to
classification, several differences arise in the grouping of countries.
First, the PPE  category includes countries which have adopted or mantaned a favorable policy
environment, thereby including countries which have not undergone a stmctured reform program,
but where on the basis of these policy performance measures, the need for such a program - or
the detrimental effect of their policies on productivity - is less apparent  (Benin, Burkina, and
Cameroon fit this group).
Second, several countries considered to be "strong reformers", on  the basis of the policy
performance variables examined here,  cannot be considered to  provide a  favorable policy
environment, because exchange rate  misalignment persists.  As a result, Mauritania and Tanzania
are considered to provide unfavorable policy environmtnts due to their exchange rate policy which
continue to impose heavy indirect taxation on the agricultural sectors, and  to make them less
competitive with respect to other sectors and in international markets.
Several countries classified as "strong reforming" countries are here also considered to have
favorable policy environments, but because the  improvements in their policy performance variables
are so recent (in 1986 or  1987), they are excluded from the comparisons of performance, since it is
too soon to expect any significant response, especially in countries where agricultural exportables
are tree crops where production response can take four or five years.  These countries are Burundi,
Ghana, Guinea, Madagascar, and Nigeria.  Malawi is also a recent reformer, but because its
agricultural exports are annual crops, a  more immediate response can be expected.- 51
Several countries are excluded from considerations due to lack of data, small size, or volatile
swings in agricultural exports related to  policies and cross-border smuggling of neighboring
countries (Benin, Zambia).  The resulting classification of FPE  and UPE includes 12 countries in
each group. 31/
/f  Angola, Cape Verde, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Mozambique,
Sao Tome, Seychelles, and Swaziland have been excluded due to their small size or lack of data.
The countries excluded from comparisons of performance for other reasons are Burundi, Ghana,
Guinea, Madagascar, and Nigeria.Annex Tabb  Cl.  Clelficaton  of  Countries by Poliy  Environment.
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Annex D Table 8.  Ratio  of implicit financial outflow from agriculture
(1980-85 average, in percent)
To total  To total  To total  To
government  government  government  agricultural
expenditure  revenue  tax revenue  GDP
Country  in agriculture
Benin  0.55  0.18
Burkina Faso  49.58  2.41  2.82  0.92
Burundi  15.69  17.03  4.06
Cameroon  86.65  4.67  5.18  4.21
CAR  68.79 a  4.04
Congo  0.32  1.37
Cote d'  Ivoi.e  450.05  17.86  22.20  17.80
Ethiopia  22.68  3.36  4.41  1.65
Gambia  13.95  3.14  3.50  2.16
Ghana  420.54  47.07  55.23  7.39
Guinea  -0.39  -0.26
Kenya  15.12  1.78  2.01  1.39
Liberia  74.19  6.29  6.56  4.06
Madagascar  204.05  22.38  28.63  8.80
Malawi  25.00  4.70  5.50  2.90
Mali  37.33  3.94  4.60  0.94
Mozambique
Niger  -0.01  0.00  0.00
Nigeria  2.57  0.16  0.02  0.08
Rwanda  135.87  11.08  3.?7
Senegal  4.57 a  0.42  5.12  0.43
Sierra Leone  93.94  13.12  0.02  3.54
Somalia  14.89  0.89  15.12  0.13
Sudan  -25.05 a  -3.28  -1.28  -1.29
Tanzania  56.35  6.83  . 47
Togo  101.35 a  8.18  61.62  8.20
Uganda  19.80  1.20  0.97  0.14
Zaire  124.38 a  6.41  1.84  3.02
Zambia  1.19  G.25  0.02  0.41
Zimbabwe  -0.47  -0.05  -0.09  -0.13
Note: Implicit financial outflows are the estimated unit transfers based on  the nominal
protection coefficients weighted by total export quantities.
a.  Estimated Government expenditures in agriculture were available for entire
1980-85  period.Amnex  0  able 9.  Weather valable  (dewAatlon  from trend of cereal vieds. In logarWnM
CoUb  197o  1971  1972  1973  1974  1S75  1978  1977  1978  1979  1s8o  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1988  1987
Senn  4-052  4.0147  -0.120  0.078  0.Q01  0.115  0.079  0.105  0.073  0.032  0.013  40.094  4Q118  .0211  0.058  0.098  0.092  4D092
Boft  A  -1.628  0173  0.986  0.228  0.736  0.342  0.750  0.346  40.0s8  4sesG  .0.116  0.099  0.154  0.103  -0.503  40084  -0.15S  0.177
Suidna  FeS  0.138  0.037  -0.025  -0.104  Q001  0.092  40.044  4Q011  0.080  0.032  .0.010  -0.023  -0.082  4-.188  -0.075  0.085  0.145  0.033
Bunid  0.031  -0.123  0.010  0.003  0.088  4Q.004  0.008  -0.04e  MOSS  0.052  -0.030  0.093  -0.005  -. o0  -0.120  .0.015  0O28  0.033
Cewnemon  -0.013  -0.017  -0.009  40.083  0.075  0.211  0.000  -0.015  4QOB  40104  .0.037  -0.059  4G025  0.094  a027  0.027  0.004  4019
Cape  Vede  0.385  0.304  -0221  -1.275  0.141  0.539  0.473  0.184  0.23  1.34  0.334  -0.011  40.001  -0.249  -0.088  -0.343  022  0.439
Chad  Q179  0.079  40.1B9  -0.122  0.115  0.012  Q0.107  .0.076  40.05e  0.031  40015  0.188  0.20  40.13  -0.322  0.117  0,113  Q.007
Con0  0.122  0211  0.166  -0.087  40.28  4.0.9  0074  400389  -0383  0.023  0.161  4.235  -0.093  -0.070  -0.050  0.027  0.201  Q221
Cow  d7eore  .015  0.197  -0.004  0.010  0.058  -0.025  -0.125  40.125  -0.132  .0.150  0.083  0.037  0cas  -109  0.101  0.134  -0.042  0.022
CAR  Q.128  0.149  0.128  Q114  40.185  -0.119  -0.117  -0.115  0.031  -0.144  -0.07  4021  -0.024  -0.041  -0.084  0.093  0122  0.15s
EtIopia  4.010  -0.024  -0.074  -0.114  -0.095  0.107  0.080  -0.098  0.107  0.150  0.121  0.070  0.189  0.037  -240  -0.133  0.071  -0.11
Gabon  -0.030  -0.032  .0.001  0.013  4015  -0.084  -0.022  40.007  -0.014  0.178  0.102  0.069  0.031  0021  -0.041  -0.083  4-0.2  4.054
GaMbia  0.142  0.132  0.057  0.058  0.071  -0.098  -Q151  40.317  0.021  -0.159  0.053  0.100  0.038  -. 229  -22  123  0.148  0233
Ghana  .012  0.019  0.03 i  Q031  0.138  Q004  0.013  0.010  0.020  0.032  40.128  0.059  -0.199  .0.780  0.127  0.204  0212  as20
Guinea  0.082  4-.2  4.012  0.005  0.013  0.018  0.024  0.024  0.034  0.029  0.053  0.081  0.088  -0.124  4.105  -0.101  0L051  .049
Gtu  dnasa  0200  015  0.090  .0.012  40.097  0.094  0117  -04208  A140  -173  -0.140  0.04  -0.095  40125  -0.091  a167  0131  0.195
Kea  0014  Q.018  0.022  0.028  40.010  .089  0.050  0.023  -0.079  -0.18o  0.217  0.007  227  056  -0.183  o097  .17S  4Q122
Lesotho  -0217  0.012  -0.4Q2  023  0.179  -0.083  4Q181  0.671  Qs94  038  0.208  0058  4-170  4152  4203  -0.102  -. 168  40125
Ubeft  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.094  0.001  -0.028  40.008  0.080  0o.1  0.004  -0.001  Q002  -0.037  40005  Q027  -0.008  0C.23  40017
Madagasow  0.040  0.009  0.014  4014  0.028  0.003  0.085  4C.027  -0o08  -0.028  4025  4058  4072  Q013  Q003  Q032  Q027  0.088
mawal  0.088  0.094  .110  -0.435  0.02Q  0.12  -0 '38  -0.240  0.315  0.071  40.148  0.052  .015  .085  4147  0.044  0.091  402
Mabu  4197  0.042  G051  0.0  0.028  4oss09  4-04  0148  0.097  0.083  40.073  40o04  0.028  009  0.040  4.038  40.089  4091
MaWawnl  0.283  0271  4305  4.319  0.052  0281  0482  0.13  4B14  40308  0.123  0219  4144  0.139  4130  0O093  4153  4QDe2
MWamMu  0.088  Q323  m171  Q1e2  4.010  -0.254  4047  4074  4200  4205  40.28  4M  4027  4120  0.237  0279  .183  0235
mamnbu  0.097  0c.62  Q128  .039  - 4051  4333  Q034  0.038  4ne3  4Q129  0.010  4092  4028  4Q007  0.019  MOD0  0.127  4Q020
NIger  4o41  Q.048  0.02s  -0217  0.015  4143  0.s1  0.083  0.081  0.128  Q153  MOO0  nc28  0O046  4401  m0ss  Q8OS1  4103
N%p%  O.Q03  40o48  4188  4Q110  0.194  0137  41ao  0587  4L041  0.oe  0234  00.82  4048  4077  4075  0.007  0.034  4L114
Fhnda  Q0.05  0.016  0.08  4-020  4-140  4007  0.088  0.014  Q012  0.019  0.04  40o14  .082  0.021  4087  4088  0.034  0.018
Sena  4098  .202  .0390  4QD98  0258  01ls  Q164  4Q189  023  4c039  4182  Qo87  4004  4204  4189  0.109  4137  0230
Sene  Leone  0S  4047  0.001  4010  0.012  .075  Q038  0.045  .089  4-114  4107  4109  .030  0.13s9  104  40128  0c.9  40m18
soma9a  m0oo  0.011  0.011  4C002  OA023  0.030  4s05s  Q011  0.021  Q027  os0  0.001  Q002  4369  4040  Q222  Q072  QDQ7
Sud-n  4018  0.056  4X14  4144  4092  .083  4.015  0.097  0.224  4071  a168o  078  498o8  4.132  4514  0.154  0.191  4153
Sw,d  4873  0.240  Q316  49ss  0.190  0.098  0.127  0.019  .32  4300  o053  n24s  - 4380  4608  0.307  0.007  0Q057  0.075
Tarami  0.002  4LO42  4050  4126  413S  n144  n128  M110  QOOE  0.057  .0o0  095  Q020  4973  4013  0.008  --  :w  405
TogP  4.090  0.24  .10S  4009  MOe07  Q12s  4017  0.007  4094  4092  0252  41i0S  0.077  4087  0.121  0.089  Q013  0.24
Uganda  0.011  4123  4003  4050  413  0.068  4.018  4029  4L004  02s9  0.178  0223  0.25  0230  4482  4-433  0.048  0.0S
Zabe  0.028  Q013  0209  0.009s  4001  40009  4024  4048  4072  0.011  4620  0.029  0.013  0o0s  0.008  4L013  0.004  0.027
Zambia  4295  4033  0.053  4183  4o  0.158  0.153  0.189  06143  Qos.1  0087  0204  4032  4988  4092  4L043  0.072  4314
ambeb  4.333  0.081  0231  4293  0.151  071  Q  0.100  I189  Mi110  4089  4048  0370  4L049  40.24  4398  0.489  0300  4301Annex  0 tabie 10.  1lasts  data:  rnumber  of pople  affected  by major  disastes,  In thousands.
1970  1971  1i72  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1960  1981  1962  1983  1984  1985  1968  1987
Angohp  0  0  0  0  0  1is6  8O  0  0  0  0  F81  0  0  0  500  0  1
Bonin  0  0  115  0  0  0  0  0  4  0  0  0  500  250  0  350  375  0
FAwanda  8S  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  410  410  1037  s80  848  671
IwidnFaso  0  0  0  1300  0  0  0  0  442  2  0  4  7  0  2502  0  0  0
3urunm  0  0  5O0  0  0  0  0  0  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Canewon  0  400  0  0  0  a  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  a  0
Cape Verte  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  2  0  0  a  0  0
CAR  0  C  0  13  0  0  0  0  0  500  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Chad  0  10  0  BOO  0  0  0  1900  0  475  1500  1500  1700  i00  1503  0  0  0
Conorc  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  35  0  0  0  0  0  30  0  35  0  0
Congo  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Cote  dlvof  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
EquaL Guinea  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  250  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
EtNopa  1700  5  0  1580  1580  0  50  am  1417  0  25  0  0  2000  500  8051  0  7330
Gabon  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
GmbIa  0  150  0  0  0  0  0  0  85  0  500  301  0  0  0  0  0  0
Ghana  0  12  0  0  0  0  0  7  0  0  0  0  0  1320O  0  2  0  0
GuInea  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  2D  0  0  0  0
Guuna-Blsa  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  4
K-na  0  150  0  0  0  0  18  ao  0  0  40  0  4  13  800  0  o  0
Lesotho  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  500  90  o  0
Ubela  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  204  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Madaga  10  0  2500  0  0  10  500  30  0  18  0  1000  118  0  114  0  84  28
MalawI  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  20  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  715
mani  0  0  0  1900  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  5  0  0  1503  1503  0  0
mawIlhl  0  0  0  1300  0  0  0  710  710  27  0  0  0  80  1853  8wo0  0  0
MuAws  0  0  25  0  0  828  0  0  0  0  100  0  32  0  0  0  0  0  N
Mo  Dn-bkq  0  501  0  0  13  87  0  400  200  so  0  6006  0  400o  5010  3068  0  6580
NIger  3  0  0  160o  8  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  3  67  3500  0  0  0
Nwla  82  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  2
Fkrda  0  0  0  3  9o5  9O0  0  1700  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  420  0  0
SWoTorn&a,  Ffdpe  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  983  0  0  0
SeNa  0  0  0  1400  0  0  0  0  3715  0  95D  0  0  605  600  0  3  0
9eychel  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
S8M  Le"  0  0  0  0  0  5  5  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  3  0
Salak  30  0  0  0  124  125  0  173  20  0  0  20  0  0  0  a  8  50i
Suda  0  0  0  60  0  75  70  0  1W  0  0  0  0  140  5202  4200  20Dr  0
tand  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  632  0  C  0
Tanzania  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  20  16  80  0  0  40  0  0  1o9  0  0
TogP  200  150  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  a  2D  0  0  0  0
Ugan  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  400  500  0  0  15D  0  0  10o0  331
zaIo  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  8  6S  500  18o  0  0  0  300  0  0  0
Zambia  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  30  1  11  12  0  0  0  0  0  0
Zabnb  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0
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Annex D Table 11.  Food Crop Price and Policy Effects
Real producer prices
(index 1979-81 =  100)  Nominal protection coefficients
Average  Average  Average  Average  Average  Average
1970-72  1975-77  1985-87  1970-72  1975-77  1985-87
Benin  108
Botswana  87  136  0.89  0.66  1.2
Burkina Paso  66  89  85
Burundi  123  104
Cameroon  89  98
CAR.  107  115
Chad
Congo  90  96
Cote d'Ivoire  120  207  93  0.73  1.04
Ethiopia  219  181  85
Gambia  71  117  74
G;hana  84  138  93  0.93  3.32  1.89
Guinea  30  114
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya  105  134  104  0.63  0.79  0.93
Liberia  59  96  80  0.86  1.38  2.43
Madagascar  80  113  172  0.53  0.7  1.06
Malawi  95  101  94  10.92  4.58  1.49
Mali  98  96  109  0.58
Mauritania
Mozambique
Niger  71  91
Nigeria  140  101  92
Rwanda  140  102  92  0.59  0.66  1.27
Senegal  103  106  88
Sierra Leone  71  91
Somalia  181  142  1.59  1.32
Sudan  66  88  1.03  1.24  1.34
Tanzania  72  130  109  1.58
Togo  139  88  1.7  1.62
Uganda  299  202
Zaire
Zambia  83  84  139  0.68  0.61  0.68
Zimbabwe  76  84  94  0.37  0.36  0.62-64  -
Arinex D Table  12.  Comparison of domestic staple food prices to imported rice and wheat prices
As a  fraction of international  As of fraction of international
rice price  wheat price
Country  Crop  1970-72  1980-82  1985-87  1970-72  1980-82  1985-87
Burkina Faso  sorghum  0.58  0.79  1.31  2.08
maize  0.58  0.79  1.31  2.08
Cameroon  mai7e  0.99  1.08  2.23  2.86
cassava  0.36  0.33  0.82  0.88
plantains  0.53  0.69  1.19  1.83
Cote d'Ivoire  maize  1.25  1.29  2.80  3.43
cassava  0.93  1.25  2.09  3.32
yams  0.92  1.19  2.07  3.15
Ghana  maizz  1.02  6.88  1.92  2.28  18.26  3.52
cassava  0.42  3.43  1.10  0.95  9.09  2.01
Kenya  maize  0.56  0.70  1.27  1.85
Malawi  maize  0.32  0.27  0.41  0.72  0.71  0.75
Mali  sorghum  0.75  0.86  1.22  1.69  2.29  2.24
Niger  sorghum  0.75  1.32  1.69  3.50
Togo  maize  0.72  0.80  1.61  2.12
sorghum  0.80  0.64  1.79  1.69
Senegal  sorghum  1.00  0.74  1.54  2.25  1.97  2.83
Zambia  maize  0.60  0.60  1.35  1.60
Zimbabwe  maize  0.47  0.43  0.65  1.06  1.15  1.18Am=e 0 Tebb 1.  Vkaus  Sp  _eafiof  Rd  Pebn  Equelon for Aadcjftura  SuPnh.
Oeendt  vabble  - egdcuur  e  t
AD  cotants  Tree  emp  empost  Anua  crop expoibs
Producer Pfw
aop  yw  (8  a8s  QW5  mOOtt  4.OD1  0.560 Pj!3"  PM)  (t3  (400  (4.00)
agge  me  a-Sp  150  40tS2 (-2 to t)  (427)  (46
FRe yer  9mo arage  0.303  0.091 (t to t'4  p30)  (204
R.W  Ias rate
Qep  yew(8  0.002  4.10s  4140  4.18  0250 p09Ed  7-a65M)  68  (.04)  (.45)  (1.79) Logged  4oie  .. 173  40210 awe  "  to  (431)  (-10.07)
01s  lbbV  4QDDtO  4Q000  40011  40042  40011  4.008  0.0022 f264  (454  (-1.67  (.1127)  (.1.19)  (40.)  (1.M
We,offer  bb  0.372  Q405  0.404  0.184  0.187  0Q242  Q48 (16.9)  (10.1)  (14.3)  P.08)  (39)  (5.6)
bawoegI  4.33  3.10  .33  5.40  3as  6.S1 (11.95)  (18.)  (81.1)  (3.5  (174  p.9t)
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